



UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON



7 August 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Army Deployment Policy, Mobilization Planning, and Force Structure in Support of a Protracted Global War on Terrorism

The nation will be prosecuting the Global War on Terrorism for an indeterminable period of time, and we must assume that the war will go on indefinitely. Therefore, I believe it is incumbent on the Army to initiate planning and establish policies and strategies to ensure that the Army can sustain reasonable policies with regard to length and frequency for overseas deployments for both active and reserve components as well as mobilization policies for the reserve components.

I specifically believe we must immediately review our policies, procedures, and planning in three areas: deployment rotation policies, mobilization planning, and force structure. We should assume that the current requirement for forces will continue indefinitely, that there will be no increase in end strength, and that the propensity of our recruits and servicemembers to enlist and re-enlist is absolutely essential to maintaining the volunteer force.

Our deployment rotation policies must reflect the demands and stresses of a protracted war. We must determine, through sound analytical study, the optimum deployment rotation policies. For example, we may determine that for the Active Component an optimal deployment rotation policy is no more than six months deployed followed by a minimum of 24 months at home station. Similarly, we may determine that for the Reserve Component the optimum is a deployment of not more than six months followed by a minimum of 60 months at home. The point is that we should study this now and complete the analysis as quickly as possible so that we can provide stability and predictability for our soldiers.

Directly associated with the deployment rotation policy is mobilization planning. We should develop a robust system, grounded in the deployment rotation policy mentioned above, that allows the greatest degree of predictability and sustainability for our citizen soldiers across the force. Failure to provide reasonable deployment policies, predictability and appropriate training to our Reserve Component forces will ultimately lead to the exodus of large numbers of our current Army Reserve and National Guard soldiers. This is a looming readiness issue with enormous impacts. ✓

The bedrock of the aforementioned issues is a thorough review of our force structure. This study must be predicated on the assumption that there will be no increase in end ✓

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strength. We must look at the types of units (e.g. SF, MPs or MI vs Armor, Field Artillery, AG, etc), the density of units (sufficiency), the balance between AC and RC, and our ability to recruit, train, and sustain the force indefinitely during the war on terrorism.

None of what I have listed are new concepts. In fact, the Army may be looking at each of these areas separately, but my sense is that they are independent snapshots – not a holistic, integrated analysis

In summary, we should, in my view, initiate a program immediately to accomplish the following:


1) Establish policies for the length and frequency of deployments for Active and Reserve components and mobilization policies for the Reserve components that will enable the all-volunteer Army to sustain the current end strength through the duration of the Global War on Terrorism (indefinitely).

2) Initiate actions to adjust the current Army force structure within current end strength to increase levels in critical MOSs where we are currently unable to meet the deployment and mobilization policies we establish in (1) above.

3) Realize that we must accept exceptions to the policies we have established in the near term until the force structure is properly adjusted to sustain the force indefinitely.

4) Restructure the Officer and Non-commissioned Officer Education Systems to support the requirements that emerge from these efforts - - not the reverse as we have tended to do in the past.

With your concurrence I will ask the Secretariat and the ARSTAF to immediately begin the staff planning and analysis to address these issues.

  
R. L. Brownlee

cf: CSA  
VCSA  
ASA(M&RA)  
Director Army Staff

Les —  
Good piece. I think what we need to <sup>do</sup> given the significant \* of studies under way in FOM 04-09 is see where the gaps are to address all the issues you cite.

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