

INFORMATION PAPER

10 September 1999

LTC Alford, TAPC-PLP, 325-9669

SUBJECT: Unit Manning Concepts, COHORT, and the Thurman Assessment

1. Purpose. To summarize previous Army attempts and analysis of unit manning concepts.
2. Facts.

a. **Fifty Years Experience.** The Army has attempted numerous forms of unit manning since the Korean War. Most were unsuccessful. During the 1950's and 1960's, the Army tried several unit replacement concepts. Then—as now—the intent was higher morale, reduced personnel turbulence, better unit integrity and combat effectiveness, and lower costs. Most unit manning systems were canceled because they failed to achieve readiness objectives or cost too much. Despite meeting its objectives, the Overseas Unit Replacement System (OVUREP) execution was interrupted during the Army expansion after the 1961 Berlin Crisis and then not restarted.

c. **The Unit Manning System.** The Army implemented the Unit Manning System (UMS) in 1981 to counter the turbulence-induced unit readiness decay caused by the Individual Replacement System (IRS). The UMS was intended to enhance combat readiness of tactical units by keeping soldiers and leaders together longer as well as improving the linkage with the reserve components, reducing impacts of specialization, and promoting a regional focus for units and soldiers. During implementation, the concept evolved into two separate, but mutually supporting systems: The Regimental System and the COHesion, Operational Readiness, Training (COHORT) System.

d. **The Regimental System.** Regimental affiliation and homebasing to maintain unit and family stability were at the core of the Regimental System and were intended as long term Army readiness enhancements. However, the system was never fully implemented, and in 1985 both affiliation and homebasing essentially became voluntary. The system's ceremonial aspects were intended to enhance soldier identification with units. The ceremonial aspects remain effectively implemented today by some units on a decentralized basis as the last vestiges of this system.

e. **COHORT.** COHORT's essence was individual stabilization that would provide opportunities to improve and sustain collective training proficiency, supported by unit movements to sustain the OCONUS force. But COHORT did not follow a single path. At different times and in different units, the Army attempted numerous COHORT models—some worked and some did not. Today, as we reconsider remedies for turbulence reduction, it is important to recognize that, for most of us, present-day individual recollection of COHORT is biased by experience with only one or two models, and whether our unit was a readiness beneficiary or billpayer.

f. **Thurman's Assessment.** In 1988 the CSA directed TRADOC to conduct a UMS assessment. Delivered a few months before the Berlin Wall fell, GEN Thurman's 1989 report documents the TRADOC assessment and his recommendations for the program's future. It also stands as an excellent historical record of the Army's UMS experience during the 1980's.

TAPC-PLP

SUBJECT: Unit Manning Concepts, COHORT, and the Thurman Assessment

GEN Thurman held that COHORT implementation...

- 1. Lacked focus and suffered from random proliferation of UMS units.
- 2. Created perceptions of "have-have not" between COHORT and non-COHORT units in the same parent unit, and "we-they" between heavy and light forces.
- 3. Was poorly timed with DIV 86 reorganization and viewed as a management burden and readiness detractor, but had long term potential for improving heavy force readiness.
- 4. Suffered from a lack of focus and consistency in DA-level proponency and TRADOC evaluation processes.

He recommended continuing COHORT with better long range planning, concept articulation, and field evaluation. But he warned that enhanced readiness would not automatically accrue from stabilization. Leaders who understand the dynamics of group cohesion must exploit it. He also warned that the two most promising COHORT models were being phased out, and the one offering the least stabilization potential (a 4-month Package Replacement System) was proliferating.

g. **The Army's Response.** In 1990 the Army implemented some of GEN Thurman's recommendations, but the Cold War ended and downsizing began. The Army was already divided over the worth of the UMS, and, as with OVUREP, further COHORT implementation was not flexible enough to survive the challenges of significant force structure changes. In April 1993 the XVIII Abn Corps commander, LTG Luck, requested COHORT elimination asserting that non-COHORT turbulence was too great to justify continuation. He cited NCO shortages in the 101st Abn (AA) Division as an example of high priority units paying the readiness bill for lower priority COHORT units. Significantly, LTG Luck argued that as the Army transitioned to a CONUS-based force we should be able to achieve better personnel stability even without COHORT. In 1995 the DCSPER eliminated COHORT as a manning methodology

h. **Recent Events.** The Army's official view towards UMS schemes during this decade has been generally negative. However, the Army remains more turbulent than ever. The promise of better stabilization in a more CONUS-based force failed to materialize since the force we reduced was serving in relatively stable long tours in Europe. The Korea short tour is now the PCS turbulence driver. Nearly half of our enlisted moves overseas are to and from Korea. 22% of CONUS turnover is driven by the requirement to man Korea, and inevitably FORSCOM is the primary billpayer. PERSTEMPO is also a significant turbulence driver. Significant growth in requirements for individual augmentation and "flushing and filling" units with deployable soldiers to support peacetime contingency deployments to the Balkans has created an environment which makes it difficult for commanders to maintain unit integrity long enough to train their units and maintain METL proficiency.

i. **Conclusions.** Recent PERSCOM analysis suggests studying a return to unit manning in the form of unit rotations to Korea that might help reduce the current high levels of PCS turbulence and mitigate its combined impacts with PERSTEMPO turbulence. A unit rotation model could be executed within our current IRS, a UMS construct, or a hybrid of the two. If the Army again considers turbulence a significant problem, a considerable store of historical experience is at hand that documents what worked and what did not in recent Army experience.

"Cohesion, readiness and unit effectiveness are worthy objectives. They must be pursued!"

--M. R. Thurman



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA 23651-5000

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

ATCG

4 March 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff, Army *Chief*

SUBJECT: TRADOC Assessment of the Unit Manning System (UMS)

1. The focus of this report is on the original purpose of the UMS: the attainment and retention of enhanced combat readiness through improved cohesion, and more effective unit training.
2. You asked me to assess the progress of the UMS to date and make recommendations regarding the program's future. That task was undertaken with three options in mind: abandon the program; continue the program unchanged; continue the program with changes. This report reviews the Army's total UMS effort since 1981 and is constructed around a review and evaluation of the various COHORT models tried. It lays out the lessons learned, applies those lessons to the current UMS Phase I expansion plan and draws conclusions. There are recommendations to eliminate those things that clearly do not make sense, to continue those that work, and to evaluate those ideas that show promise.
3. As you in charting the road ahead, this report casts the UMS into the Army's future operational environment to ascertain whether the UMS might contribute to, or detract from, mission accomplishment in that environment.
4. This assessment is a unilateral TRADOC undertaking and does not reflect the views of the Army staff or MACOM commanders with regard to the recommendations. However, it includes some MACOM views gained through visits by my team. What to do with this report? After you digest it, I suggest you decide where you wish to take the Army and whether, or how, to staff this report with the Army staff and/or MACOM commanders. We are continuing to work the recommendations, but I have directed my team to await instructions from you before briefing anyone else.
5. You have the opportunity to make significant judgements about the potential contributions of the COHORT and Regimental initiatives towards helping us win the first battle of the next war and sustain wartime operations. This report is intended to assist you in that task. Cohesion, readiness and unit effectiveness are worthy objectives. They must be pursued! I stand ready to assist you in any way.

Encl

Mx
M. R. THURMAN
General, USA
Commanding

*Hope this is
useful!*
pm

UNIT MANNING SYSTEM


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**INITIAL
CONCEPT**



Assessment of the Unit Manning System (UMS)

1. THE OVERALL UMS CONCEPT.

a. By late 1980, a consensus had developed among senior Army leaders that the overall combat readiness of the Army was being degraded by an unacceptably high level of personnel turbulence, especially in combat arms units. A series of studies, which culminated in a report by The Inspector General concluded that the problem was caused by the Individual Replacement System (IRS). High turbulence was preventing attainment and retention of cohesion and collective proficiency in units. The Unit Manning System (initially called the New Manning System) was initiated in 1981 to enhance the overall combat readiness of tactical units. A review of the original concept and its philosophical underpinnings will facilitate an understanding of this assessment of the UMS.


b. Stabilization. The driving force behind the UMS was the need to keep soldiers and leaders together in units longer. All other parameters of the concept were designed to facilitate or supplement unit-oriented stability. The approach was to develop unit life cycle models to control the movement of personnel into and out of units so as to maximize overlap of soldiers and leaders consistent with sustainability and manageability constraints. The ultimate goal was to create a stable unit environment in which higher levels of cohesion and collective proficiency could be attained and retained.

c. Unit Movement. The intent was to sustain the OCONUS forces by periodically deploying trained, cohesive replacement units as opposed to the continuous trickle of new individuals. Unit movement was to be the norm, supplemented by the IRS.

d. Regimental Affiliation. The goal was to provide for career-long affiliation of each soldier with a single regiment. All his troop assignments would be to battalions of his regiment. Such

UNIT MANNING SYSTEM

WHY REGIMENTS?



WHY COHORT?

..however much we may honor the 'unknown soldier' as the symbol of sacrifice in war, let us not mistake the fact that it is the 'known soldier' who wins battles. Sentiment aside, it is the man whose identity is well known to his fellow soldiers who has the main chance as a battle effective.

S.L.A. MARSHALL
"MEN AGAINST FIRE"
1947




Figure 1


assignments would: enhance esprit; develop a sense of belonging; increase geographic, mission, and functional specialization; facilitate assimilation into units; and provide career-long association with a small circle of peers, subordinates, leaders, and families; and hopefully, enhance retention.

e. Homebasing. A geographic (CONUS) homebase was envisioned for the Regimental colors, the battalions of the Regiment, and soldiers/families. Regimental colors were to be permanently homebased at a given installation. Rotating battalions would always return to their installation homebase. Soldiers were to enjoy the predictability of recurring assignments to the same installation over their careers.


f. During implementation, the four original pillars of the concept evolved into two separate, but mutually supporting systems: the Regimental System, which encompassed the original parameters of Regimental affiliation and homebasing, and offered long term benefits; and the COHORT System, which encompassed the original parameters of stabilization and unit movement, and offered short term benefits (figure 1). The intent was to fully implement both systems concurrently and reap both short and long term enhancements to combat readiness.

2. THE REGIMENTAL CONCEPT. There have been four initiatives undertaken to support the Regimental System: affiliation, homebasing, Regimental designations, and ceremonial enhancements. Each is described and assessed below.

a. Regimental Affiliation. A formal system of affiliating soldiers with a single Regiment was initiated in 1982 and is still in effect. Over time, however, PERSCOM considered the combined constraints of both COHORT unit stabilization and Regimental affiliation to be unmanageable, especially without a state-of-the-art automated personnel management system such as the Enlisted Distribution Assignment System (EDAS). Additionally, steady-state analysis showed



REGIMENTAL DESIGNATIONS



WHAT

A group of Bns compatible by:

- Mission
- Grade/MOS structure

Same Regimental designation
 CONUS homebase
 Same CONUS/OCONUS locations
 Framework for personnel mgt

NOT a new tactical organization

WHY

Fosters sense of belonging, identity
 Enhances cohesion
 Facilitates development of loyalty, commitment
 Improves esprit
 Perpetuates heritage/traditions

HOW

Career-long affiliation with one regiment
 Recurring Bn level assignments:
 Individual or unit replacement

Figure 2

that mandatory affiliation could not be applied to all soldiers Army-wide. In 1985, the practice of mandatory assignment within the Regiment was suspended and Regimental affiliation became voluntary. Today, affiliation by preference statement is voluntary for first term soldiers and mandatory for other soldiers and officers, although there is no constraint on the choice of Regiment, and affiliation can be changed at any time, and as often as desired. Approximately 85 percent of the combat arms soldiers are formally affiliated. Senior officers and NCO's are affiliated for symbolic purposes only. Uniform regulations were changed to accommodate the wearing of the Regimental crest on the uniform. These changes are still in effect. The machine systems do not yet provide for fully automated consideration of Regimental affiliation.

b. Regimental Designations. (Figure 2.) This initiative was undertaken to establish a Regimental framework for rotating COHORT units as a refinement of the 1957 Combat Arms Regimental System (CARS). The process involved the pairing of CONUS and OCONUS battalions, the grouping of these pairs of battalions, and realignment of unit colors and UIC's so that all the battalions in each grouping would bear the same Regimental designation, thereby establishing the notional Regiment. This process started in 1982 and is almost complete. To make Regiments large enough to sustain meaningful soldier affiliation and unit movement, Regiments had to be increased in size from two to four battalions. The process of moving to four battalions would have reduced the number of active IN, AR, FA, and AD colors from 158 to 64. This plan was approved but not fully implemented. After the first 15 Regiments were established, with extensive relocation and inactivation of colors, actions were taken to save most colors from inactivation due to the highly emotional negative reaction from active duty personnel, retirees, and associations. Almost all colors were retained on active duty. The CS/CSS branches applied the Regimental designation process to their branches by redesignating the corps or branches as the Regiment. This relatively simple change, however, has provided a substantial esprit among the technical services and may be the leading Regimental model.

c. Ceremonial Enhancements. A number of steps were taken to enhance soldier identification with the Regiment and its honors

ALL THE PIECES OF COHORT




Figure 3

and lineage. The positions of Honorary Colonel of the Regiment, Honorary Sergeant Major of the Regiment, and Distinguished Members of the Regiment were established with formal nominating and selection procedures implemented by PERSCOM. These individuals foster esprit and commitment by participating in unit level ceremonies and activities by invitational orders. Many brigade and battalion commanders exploit the intangible values of the ceremonial processes very effectively by establishing such ceremonial events as rites of passage and organization days. These local activities are a function of individual command initiatives and the program is largely decentralized.

d. Homebasing. Originally, the notion of homebasing had three connotations: a CONUS homebase for the Regimental colors; a CONUS homebase for each pair of rotating COHORT units; and a homebase for the individual soldier and his family to permit recurring assignments to the same location throughout his career. Each Regiment now has a homebase. Each pair of CONUS or OCONUS battalions now has a homebase, although this process is now largely moot, since there are no COHORT unit rotation models in effect. In 1985, the CSA directed that homebasing be made voluntary, however, no steps have been taken to implement the concept for those soldiers and families that might desire a homebase. In fact, there is a dichotomy in our institutional reasoning in that we do not implement homebasing as part of the UMS while it exists elsewhere. There is defacto homebasing among airborne soldiers of the 82d Airborne Division and we offer homebasing in the form of the Homebasing and Advanced Assignment Program (HAAP) for short tour soldiers.

e. Summary of Regimental Concept. The mechanisms for Regimental designations, affiliation, and ceremonial enhancements have continued to fall into place with the latter being the most productive of Regimental initiatives, based on informal feedback. Homebasing cannot be assessed because it was never fully implemented. Since no aspects of the Regimental System have been evaluated or studied, little can be said for the viability of the Regimental concept as a combat multiplier.


AEA CODE R

A personnel assignment code awarded to soldiers assigned to COHORT units to stabilize them in the unit life cycle (36 months). It is not removed if the unit deploys overseas.

FIRST TERMER

Initial term soldiers in the high density CMF of the COHORT unit.


3. THE COHORT CONCEPT. A full understanding of the COHORT System requires a review of the philosophical basis for the concept itself, prior to a detailed discussion of the various COHORT life cycle models that have been fielded to implement the concept. The COHORT process was (and still is) envisioned as a means to an end. The means are: stabilization (internal and external), leadership, training and readiness strategies, and a positive command climate. The end is enhanced combat readiness through improved cohesion and increased unit proficiency.



Stabilization serves only to create the stable unit environment which must be exploited by leadership trained to understand the dynamics of group cohesion. From the outset, the means has been confused with the end. The focus has been on the control of external (PERSCOM-induced) stabilization with the simplistic assumption that enhanced readiness would automatically accrue. This has not happened in all cases, leaving some commanders to question the concept. Not well understood (because it was not well articulated or marketed) is the notion that there are six pieces to the COHORT concept (figure 3). They are:

a. External and Internal Stability. Of the four parameters of the original NMS, stabilization has and will continue to dominate because it is the heart of the concept. It promises the greatest, most tangible payoff to readiness. It is also the most difficult parameter to manage in large scale because it constrains the flexibility and prerogatives of PERSCOM and commanders. While there is strong subjective evidence that reinforces the viability of stability, it has not yet been established empirically.

(1) There are two aspects to the problem of turbulence in units: external turbulence (beyond the control of the unit commander, such as PCS, unprogrammed separations, and local reassignment) and internal turbulence (intra-unit movement by the unit chain of command). Focus in the past has been entirely on control of PERSCOM-induced turbulence. Other causes of turbulence were neither addressed in policy nor measured during evaluation. The techniques for controlling external stabilization have been refined and we now know how to do that. The most effective mechanism has been award of the Assignment Eligibility and Availability (AEA) Code R to COHORT soldiers in certain COHORT models which stabilizes the soldiers in the unit for the unit life cycle (3 years). The




problem has been that the non-COHORT Army has been paying the price for stabilized COHORT units. The challenge is to solve the systemic problem of manageability during transition as well as in the steady-state. The management of first termers is well established and effective (though still a manual, off-line process). The stabilization of NCO's has been less consistent, due to selective non-compliance with policy. Officers in COHORT units have remained on the IRS. ~~Studies by Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR) show that failure to adequately stabilize leaders had an adverse impact on the effectiveness of the COHORT process.~~ In those units and on those models where officers were stabilized, the concept appeared to work.

WRAIR

(2) Personnelists must be instructed that one of their goals must be unit stability as matter of principle with or without COHORT. Unless such orders are issued, personnelists will try to fix the rules for maximum management flexibility at the expense of unit readiness, and they will do it in the name of unit readiness as measured by volume. Controlling external turbulence is only half of the fix.

Commanders must also control ~~internal~~ turbulence. Limited ARI studies in heavy units have shown internal turbulence to be as widespread in COHORT units as in non-COHORT units. While external turbulence can be centrally controlled, internal turbulence cannot. Internal stability must become intuitive to the chain of command. Leaders need to be educated on the need for maintaining crew, squad, and platoon integrity and given the opportunity and motivation to do so.

b. Training Strategies and Leader Training. The concept envisions training strategies and programs tailored to the life cycles of specific COHORT models in order to optimize training effectiveness, and develop leaders trained to understand and exploit the dynamics of group cohesion. The model for institutionalization lies in the concepts espoused in the Light Infantry Division White Paper, which led to the Light Fighters Course, which in turn, led to leader bonding. This is a case where we wrote an Organizational and Operational (O&O) Plan, supported it with institutional training, and it led to success. Doctrine + institutional training = success. The issuance of FM 25-100, which focuses on leader development and NCO responsibilities, provides an opportunity to capitalize on a training vector to increase readiness. COHORT could enable the commander to progressively raise his unit's performance levels as he moves through the training management cycle described in FM 25-100. COHORT leaders should spend less effort on sustainment training of ever-changing crews, teams, and squads, while devoting more time to taking stable, cohesive teams higher into the band of excellence and keeping them there. The 10th ID(L), for example, is able to routinely conduct tactical night live fire training with junior leaders because squads and platoons are stable over time. COHORT units should exhibit greater collective proficiency and teamwork. Our experience with the Canadian Army Trophy competition tells us that this process



COHORT TRIAD






Figure 4

works. We stabilized tank crews and platoons for 9-12 months, and provided stable leadership, common goals, and a shared training challenge. The result was unprecedented success.

c. Stability-Based Readiness Model. The current Unit Status Report (USR) system measures the personnel aspects of readiness in terms of strength levels alone. While there is general acknowledgement that the USR is not a true measure of readiness, it is the system which the Army has grown to accept. It is counter-productive to cohesion because it is based on the "level-of-fill" mindset or the "volumetrics" rather than the quality of fill (Incidentally, past recruiting command success can be traced to a decision to go for quality rather than quantity.). The USR does not address such factors as small unit stability, cohesion, and retention of proficiency. Additionally, we are the only service that harbors the notion that the entire ~~Army must be ready at all times~~ and that scheduled stand-down of units is unacceptable. It is interesting that we have become willing to declare a unit C 5 for a period encompassing new equipment fielding but have not matured to the same level for personnel "fielding". We should rethink our notions of readiness and be willing to accept scheduled readiness downtimes as we establish, reload, disestablish, and deploy COHORT units. We need a USR model whose readiness measures address COHORT life cycles. Two initiatives to address the readiness issue were started and aborted: an ARI-developed stability based readiness model and a TRADOC-developed Peacetime Readiness Study. Both should be resumed. Additionally, TRADOC is designing a test to draw empirical correlations between small unit stability, cohesion, and collective performance (figure 4). If successful, we will have a basis for quantifying the contributions of stability and cohesion to combat readiness which, in turn, should lead to a more meaningful USR system.



d. Command Climate. COHORT is a command philosophy and a unit modus operandi. For such a conceptual program in its embryonic stage to develop properly, there are two command-related prerequisite conditions which appear to surface from evaluation feedback. First, the ~~concept will not develop in a hostile or skeptical~~ command environment because the stabilization rules are not followed and the unit trains and operates under the old IRS modality. Second, the concept operates best when an entire division is COHORT and the concept becomes an installation modus operandi with a clear and consistent command climate. There appears to be a direct correlation between command climate and COHORT success, which is based, not on the old "can do" attitude of making anything work by hand-jamming, but as an appreciation of the spirit, as well as the letter of the policies which govern COHORT. Since the COHORT concept deals with the intangibles of soldier will, morale, esprit, and synergy, it will flourish most effectively in an environment where the command climate is sensitive to the importance of these combat multipliers.



e. Summary of COHORT Concept. The full potential of the COHORT concept has not yet been tapped, largely because the Army has approached the program mechanically rather than philosophically. Our perspective has been focused on some of the trees rather than on the forest. Our experience tells us that the concept is viable and potentially very powerful. To successfully institutionalize the COHORT System, however, we must approach the task as we have with the Infantry Division (Light); ~~with a well articulated concept, an O&O Plan, a white paper, and consistent institutional support.~~

4. COMBAT SERVICE AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT. The initial concept envisioned application of the UMS to as much of the Army as feasible, although primary effort was placed on selected combat arms. Early analysis and staffing found that neither the COHORT nor the Regimental System, as initially defined, would work with CS/CSS forces. While 68 percent of Army enlisted authorizations are in CS/CSS MOSs, only 33 percent are in branch units, with the remainder in combat arms units and TDA organizations. Additionally, the disposition of CS/CSS units was not balanced between CONUS and OCONUS, MTOEs were not standardized, and mission requirements precluded downtime for startup deployment. While these factors led to the conclusion that COHORT of CS/CSS forces was infeasible, that conclusion was predicated on the early assumption that COHORT would be based on a unit rotation/replacement system. The low percentage of CS/CSS soldiers in branch units precluded a meaningful affiliation program. The current UMS approach to the CS/CSS forces is: continuation of the IRS to man CS/CSS units, with some stabilization of low density MOS soldiers in combat arms units and affiliation of CS/CSS soldiers with their branch. Given the emergence of non-deploying COHORT models, the application of the COHORT concept to some CS/CSS type units appears more feasible and should be reassessed.

5. WARTIME SUSTAINMENT. Our intent has always been to develop a UMS applicable to both peacetime and wartime operations. Our current wartime replacement plan envisions that units will be replenished with a mix of individual and small unit (squad/crew) replacements which may be fed directly into committed forces, in small numbers, or in larger numbers to depleted units pulled out of action for reconstitution and retraining. The scenario will be dependent upon the number and nature of casualties sustained. All COHORT models operate in a manner consistent with this process. Thus, with COHORT, we will practice in peacetime what we plan to do in wartime and the lessons we learn will facilitate refinement of our wartime sustainment plans. MACOM commanders agree that the UMS is consistent with expectations of wartime sustainment operations.

6. THE COHORT SYSTEM, THE REGIMENTAL SYSTEM, OR BOTH? Initially, the two systems were developed concurrently and with full inter-dependence from the outset. Both were initiated vigorously. In practice, the startup of the COHORT and Regimental initiatives, overlaid on DIV 86, force modernization, and light infantry division conversion proved too much to manage simultaneously. In 1985, the COHORT and Regimental Systems were decoupled and developed separately. Since then, although both programs continued, the COHORT System has become dominant, and today the term UMS is synonymous with COHORT. Since the Army's evaluation focused totally on the COHORT System, the bulk of this assessment addresses the COHORT system. Since, by contrast, little can be said about the viability of the Regimental System, a study of the Regimental System should assess the future relationship of the two programs.

7. COHORT MODELS.

a. The greatest challenge to institutionalizing the COHORT concept is to find the optimal COHORT model(s) that offer enough stability to enhance readiness, yet can be proliferated and sustained in the steady-state. One thing we have done extensively is try COHORT models. We have looked at: fixed life cycle and continuous life cycle models; two-way rotational, one-way replacement, and non-deploying models; and models at all echelons from squad to brigade. Some models never got off the drawing board. Others were fielded and/or analyzed extensively. Some have proven unsustainable or unsupportable, while others have shown great promise. Some promising models have been fielded but never evaluated or analyzed for sustainability.

b. Generic COHORT Model Characteristics. Before describing and assessing specific COHORT models, a review of the generic characteristics of COHORT models is in order. All COHORT models can be described in terms of the following features:

(1) Assignment Windows. Fixed points or periods in a unit's life cycle when soldiers may be assigned into or reassigned out of the COHORT unit.

VARIABLE ENLISTMENT LEGISLATION

- Allows recruitment of enlistees for whole year increments plus IET time
- Permits design of COHORT life cycles with whole year increments

- VEL enacted OCT 83
- For 3 - year enlistees
- COHORT volunteer
- Bonus option
- CMF 11, 13 & 19





Figure 5

(2) Intervals. The period of time between assignment windows during which soldiers are stabilized in the COHORT unit. Models considered to date have intervals of 4, 12, or 36 months, depending on the model.

(3) Variable Enlistment Legislation (VEL). (Figure 5.) A formal contract option in which a recruit who enlists for a COHORT unit joins for 3 years plus his IET time (approximately 4 months). This gives the VEL soldier a full 3 years in the COHORT unit which facilitates life cycle management. VEL soldiers are required for any model which has assignment windows at 12 month intervals. VEL is a non-problem, and, in fact, may be the way to go to reduce recruiting demands. If a recruit serves 3 years after completion of training, it automatically lengthens the term of service, thereby reducing the number of recruits required.

(4) Strength Profiles. Since soldiers are stabilized between assignment windows, the unit strength drops steadily during the interval between windows due to unprogrammed losses and other exceptions to stabilization rules. The strength profile is described by the ceiling (upper limit) to which assigned strength will accrue and the floor (lower limit) below which unit strength will not be allowed to attrit. Strength levels may be expressed in terms of overall unit strength or the strength of high density CMF first termers population of the unit.

(5) Sawtooth. (Figure 6.) Plotting the strength profile of a COHORT unit over time in terms of the ceiling, the floor, the role of attrition, and the interval will produce a sawtooth-shaped graph. Exact shape of the sawtooth will vary among COHORT models based on the characteristics of the model.

(6) Echelon. Either battalion or company level.

(7) Deployability. Either non-deployer (unit never leaves its parent unit or station) or deployer. There are two types of deploying COHORT models: replacement (one-way flow of COHORT units from CONUS to OCONUS), and rotation (one CONUS unit and a like-type OCONUS unit swap places periodically).

COHORT "SAWTOOTH" PROFILE




Figure 6.

COHORT MODEL CHARACTERISTICS


<u>CHARACTERISTIC</u>	<u>TRADITIONAL MODEL</u>	<u>SUSTAINED MODEL</u>
ECHELON	BN OR CO	BN OR CO
CONUS OR OCONUS	EITHER	EITHER
DEPLOYER OR NON-DEPLOYER	EITHER	NON-DEPLOYER
TYPE LIFE CYCLE	FIXED	CONTINUOUS
LIFE CYCLE DURATION	3 YEARS	INFINITE
ESTABLISH/DISESTABLISH DATES	YES	NO
LEADER TRAINING PROGRAM	YES	NO
ASSIGNMENT WINDOW INTERVAL	36 MONTHS *	4 OR 12 MONTHS
INDIVIDUAL STABILIZATION PERIOD	36 MONTHS	4 OR 12 MONTHS

* HAS ANNUAL REPLACEMENT OF UNPROGRAMMED LOSSES ONLY (NO REASSIGNMENTS)

Figure 7

(8) Life Cycles. Either fixed (unit establishes on a specific date and disestablishes 3 years later), or continuous (unit has no fixed life cycle).

c. Categories of COHORT Models. COHORT models are generally categorized as Traditional or Sustained COHORT Models based on their characteristics (figure 7). Initially, and until 1986, all models conceptualized, fielded or analyzed were ~~Traditional Models that generally provide the greatest degree of stability,~~ because external stabilization was mandated for their unit life cycle. They turned out to be more difficult to manage than Sustained COHORT Models. In 1986, Sustained COHORT Models were fielded to replace most Traditional Models. They are characterized by less stringent stabilization requirements and are




easier to manage systemically. Currently, Sustained COHORT Models are a major departure from the original concept in that Sustained COHORT Models do not mandate stability in the unit beyond the interval between windows. Soldiers or leaders can join the unit at a fill window and depart at the next window. Thus, maximum stability varies from 4 to 36 months, depending on the model. Reduced to fundamentals, the debate within the Army over which model(s) are most feasible centers around the degree of mandated stability of particular models. There is an inverse relationship between the degree of stability (hence, the potential for enhanced readiness) of a particular model and its steady-state sustainability. Currently, all sustained COHORT models are

PACKAGE REPLACEMENT SYSTEM

Upon receipt of a package of replacements, the commander has many options for assignment of soldiers within his unit.

CYCLE	WINDOWS		
A	JAN	MAY	SEP
B	FEB	JUN	OCT
C	MAR	JUL	NOV
D	APR	AUG	DEC



Replacements to a company could end up....





Figure 8

sustained by the Package ~~Replacement System~~ (PRS) (figure 8), which is the management process developed to schedule soldiers and leaders into COHORT units. PERSCOM places all sustained COHORT units on one of four assignment cycles (A, B, C, D). Each cycle identifies the specific months during which replacements are assigned into units as a package and others are reassigned out or separated via the IRS. While the PRS was designed to support Sustained COHORT Models, it is used to fill other COHORT models, such as the Traditional Company Replacement Model to Korea. Each of the major COHORT models are described in the following paragraphs.

PACKAGE REPLACEMENT SYSTEM

A replacement system which moves groups of soldiers (including first term soldiers that trained together in IET and career soldiers from the total Army) to a Sustained COHORT unit at 4-or 12-month intervals.

SUPPORTS




SUSTAINED COHORT

Non-deploying COHORT Model without a fixed life cycle. Soldiers and cadre assigned into and out of units only at prescribed assignment windows.

COMPANY REPLACEMENT TO EUROPE (18/18)

ORIGINAL TRADITIONAL COHORT MODEL



LEGEND	LEADER	FIRST TERMER
■ ONE-WAY ASSIGNMENT WINDOW	1 WEEK	1 WEEK
▨ STABILIZATION INTERVAL	36 MONTHS	36 MONTHS
MINIMUM INDIVIDUAL STABILIZATION	36 MONTHS	36 MONTHS
VEL REQUIREMENT		YES

PROS

- Mandated stabilization for 3 years
- Maximum soldier / leader overlap (3 years)
- Strong horizontal and vertical bonding
- Permits 3 year progressive training program

CONS

- Readiness downtime at startup, disestablishment
- Requires all VEL enlistees
- Hardest for PERSCOM to manage (micro-management to company level)
- Installation/community impacts in USAREUR
- Not sustainable in long tour areas (unit tour length ≠ individual tour length)

Figure 9

d. Company Replacement Model (18/18). (Figure 9.)


(1) Description. This Traditional Model had a fixed 3-year life cycle. The unit formed in FORSCOM and trained there for 18 months, then deployed to USAREUR (with families) where it remained for 18 months, then disestablished. The deployment was technically a group movement, not a unit movement (unit colors and UIC did not move). Deployment of the COHORT "unit" from FORSCOM left a zero-strength company size unit which was backfilled with the arrival of another COHORT group. Upon disestablishment in USAREUR, the COHORT unit was replaced by another COHORT unit deploying from FORSCOM. This model operated on a one-way "unit" replacement flow from FORSCOM to USAREUR. During formation in FORSCOM, leaders were assigned 30-60 days prior to arrival of the first term group to allow leaders to in-process, get families settled, and undergo a formal leader training program.

(2) Fielding History. This model was actually in the field as Project COHORT (a small HQDA experiment) when the UMS was started. The project was assimilated and continued. Altogether 44 companies (IN, AR, FA) were formed on this model, of which 35 completed their life cycles. This model was field evaluated by TEXCOM and WRAIR and analyzed for sustainability by CAA.

(3) Assessment. This model was found to be unsupportable in USAREUR because the unit's OCONUS life cycle (18 months) did not match the 36 month individual tour length of accompanied soldiers. Upon disestablishment of a unit, local installations could not absorb the "residual" soldiers and they had to be reassigned intra-theater. This same problem, when projected to a steady-state via analysis, made this model unsustainable. Additionally, the need to form units in CONUS every 18 months actually increased intra-CONUS turbulence. This model has been terminated.

COMPANY REPLACEMENT TO KOREA (24/12)

ORIGINAL TRADITIONAL COHORT MODEL



LEGEND	LEADER	FIRST TERMER
■ ONE-WAY ASSIGNMENT WINDOW	1 WEEK	1 WEEK
▨ STABILIZATION INTERVAL	36 MONTHS	36 MONTHS
MINIMUM INDIVIDUAL STABILIZATION	36 MONTHS	36 MONTHS
VEL REQUIREMENT		YES

PROS

- Mandated stabilization for 3 years
- Maximum soldier / leader overlap (3 years)
- Strong horizontal and vertical bonding
- Permits 3 year progressive training program
- OCONUS tour lengths the same for units and soldiers
- No dependents involved in unit deployment

CONS

- Readiness downtime at startup, disestablishment
- Requires all VEL enlistees
- Hardest for PERSCOM to manage (micro-management to company level)
Inhibits ability to levy

Figure 10

e. Company Replacement Model (24/12). (Figure 10.)


(1) Description. This model life cycle is the same as the 18/18 model except that the unit remains in FORSCOM or WESTCOM for 24 months, then deploys to Korea without families for 12 months. Because of the 2:1 difference in CONUS-OCONUS time, there are two CONUS units paired with each OCONUS unit and the CONUS units alternate deployments each year.

(2) Fielding History. This model was in the field as part of Project COHORT before it was assimilated by the UMS and expanded. Although 49 companies were initially formed, only 15 were deployed to Korea before deployments were suspended because the same units were part of the Army's Infantry Division - Light (ID(L)) conversion program, which had priority. In 1987, this model was reinitiated and now includes 24 heavy and light companies from eight installations in CONUS. The first deployment is scheduled to occur in Oct 89. This model was field evaluated by TEXCOM and analyzed for sustainability by CAA.

(3) Assessment. This model was found to be sustainable in steady-state analysis and supportable in the field, primarily because the OCONUS unit tour length is the same as the soldiers' unaccompanied tour length, which avoids the burdens of moving families and reassigning "residual" soldiers at unit disestablishment. However, EUSA, FORSCOM, and WESTCOM have reservations about the scheme. EUSA has expressed concern over a possible short timers syndrome as the unit approaches the end of its life cycle in Korea. Field evaluation data shows evidence of this phenomenon, although the problem was considered manageable. FORSCOM considers the training of Korea-bound units to be a distractor to their primary mission. WESTCOM feels that the isolation of Hawaii from the mainland already causes morale and discipline problems. Making the 25th ID(L) a sustaining base for Korea-bound units will compound these problems. On the other hand, the initial deployments will facilitate conversion of the 2d ID to the AOE design. This scheme is presently underway with no plans to evaluate the model or the overall deployment scheme. It appears that a review of this model is in order to insure that it is still consistent with the overall thrust of the UMS.

BATTALION ROTATION TO EUROPE (36/36)

ORIGINAL TRADITIONAL COHORT MODEL



LEGEND

	LEADER	FIRST TERMER
TWO-WAY ASSIGNMENT WINDOW	9 MONTHS	1 WEEK
STABILIZATION INTERVAL	6-12 MONTHS	36 MONTHS
MINIMUM INDIVIDUAL STABILIZATION	48 MONTHS	36 MONTHS
VEL REQUIREMENT	YES	

PROS

- Consistent with Army management systems (battalion UIC)
- No startup (steady-state) or disestablishment
- Maximum stabilization for first termers
- Strong horizontal and vertical bonding
- Permits 18 month progressive training program (between rotation and first termer reload)

CONS

- Readiness downtime during rotation and fill window
- Requires train-up after fill window and rotation to CONUS (leader reload)
- Requires all VEL enlistees
- Stabilization interval for leaders too long (48 months)

Figure 11


f. Battalion Rotation Model (36/36). (Figure 11.)

(1) Description. Units on this model are linked in compatible CONUS-OCONUS pairs (ideally with the same Regimental designation). Both units are on the same schedule. Unlike Company Replacement, this model has a continuous life cycle (no fixed start or end dates). Each unit spends 3 years in a MACOM and rotates with each other. There is a battalion first term assignment window every 3 years at the mid-point of the units' tour in a MACOM. This model envisions no leader training program.

(2) Fielding History. In 1984-86, four pairs of FORSCOM-USAREUR linked battalions were formed and rotated. These units were evaluated by TEXCOM and analyzed by CAA for sustainability. This model was short-lived. After startup and one rotation, the evaluation was terminated (before the first term reload point). Presently, this model is no longer being considered for implementation or expansion.

(3) Assessment. Feedback from field evaluation and the chain of command showed that this model was unacceptable to USAREUR because local installations and communities could not absorb the impacts of rotating battalions. While this model may be viable for other long tour areas, such as Hawaii, it should not be pursued in the near term because other non-deploying models appear more feasible and should be explored first.

NON-DEPLOYING BATTALION - (36 MONTHS)



LEGEND	LEADER	FIRST TERMER
■ ONE-WAY ASSIGNMENT WINDOW	1 WEEK	1 WEEK
▨ STABILIZATION INTERVAL	36 MONTHS	36 MONTHS
MINIMUM INDIVIDUAL STABILIZATION	36 MONTHS	36 MONTHS
VEL REQUIREMENT		YES

PROS

- Greatest potential for enhanced readiness
Permits 3 year progressive training program
- Greatest potential for improved cohesion
Mandated stabilization for 3 years
Maximum soldier/leader overlap (3 years)
- Consistent with Army management systems (battalion UIC)
- MACOM's train and retain units

CONS

- Readiness downtime at startup and disestablishment
- Initial unit train-up required
- Requires all VEL enlistees
- Harder for PERSCOM to manage than sustained models
Inhibits ability to levy

Figure 12

g. Traditional Non-deploying Battalion Model (36 months).
(Figure 12.)

(1) Description. This model has a fixed 3-year life cycle with soldiers and leaders stabilized for the full life cycle. The model has a leader training program. There are annual "top-off" assignment windows where unprogrammed losses are replaced. The unit forms, trains, and disestablishes at the same location (could be CONUS or OCONUS). A back-filled unit is then formed. Upon disestablishment, most soldiers in the old unit are available to PERSCOM to fulfill worldwide IRS requirements (i.e. OCONUS levies). Some soldiers, however, will be eligible for back-to-back COHORT assignments. They will constitute a nucleus for the backfill unit to receive the COHORT first term package from the training base. This unit reconstitution process is fully consistent with our wartime sustainment planning and will allow us to develop, evaluate, and refine wartime casualty replacement procedures routinely in peacetime.


(2) Fielding History. This model was not envisioned in the initial concept. It was fielded as a mechanism to facilitate the activation and conversion of infantry forces to the ID(L) design. A total of 27 battalions were established on this model (18 activated, 9 converted) in the 6th, 7th, 10th, and 25th Divisions. Although this model was not evaluated by TEXCOM or analyzed for sustainability by CAA, WRAIR conducted extensive studies of the human dimensions of COHORT in the 7th ID(L).

(3) Assessment. Of the models fielded to date, this model appears to be one of the most promising, based on the subjective judgments of commanders and human factors experts. It has been successfully supported at the installation level in two Divisions (7th and 10th) and remains the preferred model by the current I Corps commander and the 10th ID(L) commander. The most important lesson derived from this model (based on informal assessment) is that the COHORT concept seems to operate most effectively and enjoy strongest command support when an entire division is COHORT. Unfortunately, there are only nine battalions left on this model and all are being phased out despite command support for the model. If the UMS is to continue, this model should be reinstated in at least one division and fully evaluated.

PACKAGE REPLACEMENT SYSTEM (PRS-4)

CURRENT

SUSTAINED COHORT MODEL (BN OR CO)



LEGEND

	LEADER	FIRST TERMER
<input type="checkbox"/> TWO-WAY ASSIGNMENT WINDOW	1 WEEK	1 WEEK
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> STABILIZATION INTERVAL	4 MONTHS	4 MONTHS
MINIMUM INDIVIDUAL STABILIZATION	4 MONTHS	4 MONTHS
VEL REQUIREMENT		NO

PROS

- Easiest for PERSCOM to manage (closest to IRS)
- Does not require VEL enlistees
- MACOM's train and retain units
- Less readiness downtime than traditional models
- No startup, deployment, or disestablishment

CONS

- Least potential for enhanced readiness
- Meaningful cohesion cannot develop
 - Stabilization limited to 4 months
 - Least soldier/leader overlap
- No opportunity for progressive training
 - Turnover every 4 months

Figure 13

h. Sustained COHORT Model (PRS-4). (Figure 13.)

(1) Description. This model is a non-deploying model with a continuous life cycle. It has assignment windows every 4 months during which soldiers and leaders can move into or out of the unit. All soldiers and leaders are stabilized for the 4 months between fill windows. There is no AEA Code R stabilization applied. This model can apply to the company or battalion. There is no leader training program. Although first term soldiers are trained and assigned as a COHORT package, there is no policy requirement to keep the package intact at any point in the assignment pipeline. Packages may be distributed within the unit at the commander's discretion.

(2) Fielding History. This model was implemented in 1986 following termination of the Battalion Rotation Model and the field evaluation. Presently, this model is being fielded for USAREUR, WESTCOM, and all heavy units in FORSCOM (less units on the Korea model). There are 141 companies on this model with 177 projected in the Phase I plan. It has not been subjected to field evaluation or sustainability analysis.


Not Evaluated

Not Analyzed

(3) Assessment. Given the absence of mandated stabilization and the frequency of fill windows, this model, in its present state, offers little opportunity to attain or retain the intended readiness enhancements of the UMS. It is designed to maximize the management flexibility of the personnel system. The WRAIR assessment, based on extensive cohesion studies, is that 4-month stability will not provide enhanced cohesion. Progressive training programs do not appear possible with programmed turbulence at 4-month intervals. However, this model may be necessary because it is the only one that can be supported with non-VEL enlistees. While it appears to be the least desirable of all COHORT models considered, it needs to be evaluated at the division level. To be meaningful, however, the following stabilization rules for individual soldiers and leaders should be applied: first term soldiers stabilized in the battalion for their full enlistment period; leaders (NCO's and officers) stabilized in the battalion for 2 years. Additionally, a formal leader training program should be applied to this model before it is evaluated. This model does not support FM 25-100 if squad leaders and platoon sergeants move in and out of units on a 4-month basis.

PACKAGE REPLACEMENT SYSTEM (PRS-12)

CURRENT SUSTAINED COHORT MODEL (BN OR CO)



LEGEND	LEADER	FIRST TERMER
 TWO-WAY ASSIGNMENT WINDOW	1 WEEK	1 WEEK
 STABILIZATION INTERVAL	12 MONTHS	12 MONTHS
MINIMUM INDIVIDUAL STABILIZATION	12 MONTHS	12 MONTHS
VEL REQUIREMENT		YES

PROS

- High potential for steady-state feasibility
 - Easier for PERSCOM to manage than traditional models
 - 12 month stabilization is long enough for cohesion to develop
 - Facilitates cyclic annual training programs
- Less readiness downtime than traditional models
 - No startup, deployment, disestablishment
- MACOM's train and retain units

CONS

- Cohesion potential not as good as traditional model
 - Less stabilization, soldier/leader overlap
- Training potential not as good as traditional model
 - Progressive training limited to 12 months
- Requires all VEL enlistees

Figure 14

i. Sustained COHORT Model (PRS-12). (Figure 14.)

(1) Description. This model is the same as the PRS-4 model except that the periodic assignment windows are annual.

(2) Fielding History. This model was not intended for fielding by the Army staff. It was applied to the 7th and 10th ID(L) as a compromise because those divisions wanted to retain the Traditional Non-deploying Battalion Model. There are currently 60 companies on this model and 88 projected in the Phase I plan.

Not Evaluated

Not Analyzed

(3) Assessment. This model appears to have high potential as a feasible steady-state model. While not offering as much stability and training potential as the Traditional Model, the 12-month stability interval is considered the minimum acceptable by WRAIR for enhanced cohesion and will support annual training cycles, prevalent in many units today, and it is easy to transition into. The same stabilization rules recommended for the PRS-4 model are applicable here as is the recommendation for a formal leader training program. This model should be evaluated in a COHORT division environment.

THE LESSONS OF HISTORY




Figure 15

j. Summary of COHORT Models. An assessment of the models tried to date tells us to reinforce our successes by pursuing those models that work and terminating those models that do not work:

(1) Reestablish and evaluate the Traditional Non-Deploying Battalion Model because it appears to offer the greatest payoff for readiness and the commanders who had it still want it.

(2) Retain and evaluate the Sustained COHORT Model (PRS-12) with increased stabilization rules because it offers the most promising balance between stability and sustainability.

(3) Retain and evaluate the Sustained COHORT Model (PRS-4) with increased stabilization rules. Although it is closer to the IRS than all other models and offers the least potential for progressive training, it is the only one that does not require VEL enlistees and may be necessary for sustainability.

(4) Keep the 24/12 Company Replacement Model to Korea because the model is workable for short tour areas, but the Korea replacement scheme should be reviewed.

(5) Defer pursuit of any deployment models to long tour areas based on experience with the Company Replacement Model (18/18) and Battalion Rotation Model (36/36) to Europe.

8. THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTATION. Before looking at the performance of COHORT units or deciding whether to pursue it further, it is necessary to understand our strategy for UMS implementation, the environment in which we expanded the program, and the impacts that implementation has had on evaluation results and overall UMS acceptability.

a. Implementation Strategy. Our initial strategy was to implement the UMS Army-wide without prior testing. A historical study of past Army experiments in unit rotation/replacement, and the wartime experiences of other armies led to the conclusion that stable units are more cohesive, are better trained, fight harder, and withstand the stresses of combat better than turbulent units (figure 15). The intent was to quickly institutionalize as much of the

concept into as much of the Army as possible. Initial focus was on the IN, AR, and FA, to be followed by the other combat arms and CS/CSS forces later, to the extent feasible. Automated systems were designed and developed to integrate COHORT expansion and Regimental affiliation into the on-going implementation of force modernization and DIV 86 conversion without the disruption of any program. Because of initial concerns over expanding too quickly and over-taxing installations and units undergoing modernization, COHORT was initiated at the company level with the goal of escalating to battalion models, using a "crawl-walk-run" approach. To avoid saturating any single installation too quickly during startup, individual COHORT companies were concurrently established in many battalions, installations, and MACOMs. The implementation pace was determined by the capacities of PERSCOM, USAREC, and the training base to access, train, and manage COHORT soldiers off-line. Selection of COHORT units was largely decentralized to MACOM's and driven by a number of local factors.

b. The Environment. The operational environment in which we launched the UMS created unanticipated problems, to include tensions between heavy and light forces during initial implementation, which linger today. These problems were caused in part by:


(1) The introduction of the COHORT and Regimental Systems into the force during the heaviest period of force modernization and force restructuring in decades (1981-88).

(2) The creation of new, light divisions and the reorganization of others to the ID(L) design, and the strength plus-ups of those divisions.

(3) The down-sizing of heavy divisions (DIV 86) to the AOE design.

c. Implementation in Heavy Forces. Heavy units absorbed the combined impacts of COHORT and Regimental startups, force modernization, and DIV 86 reorganization/down-sizing simultaneously, and associated that experience with COHORT. To reduce those impacts, we proliferated COHORT companies in a widely dispersed pattern to spread the readiness impacts of startup. This strategy

THE QUASI-COHORT BATTALION



Quasi-COHORT Battalion - Has a mix of COHORT and non-COHORT companies (usually one to two COHORT line companies). In practice, commanders of quasi-COHORT battalions operate in the Individual Replacement System modality.

Figure 16

backfired on us and created major unanticipated reactions which have impeded the progress and acceptability of COHORT in heavy forces. The most salient of these were:

(1) Proliferation of COHORT Units. The Company Replacement Model saw the proliferation of individual COHORT companies into many MACOMs, divisions, installations, and different type units in a short period of time. This approach exposed many commanders to a seemingly random distribution of COHORT companies scattered in the midst of their force modernization and DIV 86 conversion problems. In heavy forces, COHORT was never proliferated anywhere in sufficient density to cause commanders to address the concept as a modus operandi and to develop it fully. Based on WRAIR reports, commanders recognized the cohesive nature and tactical proficiency of the COHORT companies and acknowledged such, but they simply did not command, manage, or lead them any differently from their non-COHORT units. TEXCOM data indicates that the scattered distribution of units made Army-level management more difficult and compounded data collection, analysis, information flow, and the overall control of implementation.

(2) Quasi-COHORT Battalions. (Figure 16.) The widely dispersed pattern of COHORT company startups resulted in "quasi-COHORT" battalions (those with a mix of COHORT and non-COHORT companies) operating in an IRS battalion environment. Although we have learned that the company is the largest true COHORT unit with strong primary group bonding, we have also learned that a COHORT company cannot operate to potential in a quasi-COHORT battalion. The commanders could not manage two separate personnel systems or develop two separate training programs. Consequently, the COHORT companies were trained in the IRS modality. The battalion is the organizational placenta within which the COHORT company is protected, nurtured, and developed. Chain of command feedback and WRAIR data point to the quasi-COHORT battalion phenomenon as a major cause of low acceptability of COHORT in heavy forces.

(3) "Have-Have Not" Syndrome. Commanders were frustrated at the prospect of having some fully stabilized COHORT companies and some IRS companies in the same battalion. Since

Cadre

All personnel in a COHORT unit except the high density MOS first termers. Includes low density MOS soldiers.

the COHORT units were formed over-strength, fenced from external turbulence, and frequently exempt from support details, a groundswell of resentment developed in some units and a "have-have not" syndrome prevailed between the COHORT (have) companies and the non-COHORT (have not) companies of the same battalion. Startup policies normally formed the cadre of COHORT companies from the non-COHORT companies of the same battalion. The understrength companies were then required to perform an inequitable share of undesirable duty with fewer soldiers. This situation was compounded by the red carpet treatment and high level visibility accorded the initial COHORT companies which deployed to Europe. Well-meaning policies resulted in soldiers being pulled off housing waiting lists to make their quarters available to lower ranking COHORT soldiers on the day of arrival in-country. Such incidents created a resentment towards COHORT soldiers and families which hampered their assimilation into the new ~~battalion and the community~~. Feedback to both WRAIR and TEXCOM from European commanders indicated that, initially, many COHORT companies were not well received or assimilated by the soldiers and families of their sister non-COHORT companies, despite their generally superior tactical proficiency.

(4) Deployment Models to Europe. The initial COHORT concept was based on COHORT unit deployments. We fielded two such models to USAREUR initially: Company Replacement (18/18) and Battalion Rotation (36/36). Both models proved infeasible and unacceptable to USAREUR, in part, because unit deployment contributed to the "transition shock" of heavy forces.

(5) Timing of Implementation. In light of the stresses placed on heavy forces, the UMS was seen as another near term management burden and readiness detractor, despite the merits of the concept and the long term potential for improved readiness. Many perceived it as poorly timed. Recognizing that the UMS was developed in response to field commanders' concerns with high turbulence and low readiness, many commanders in heavy units undergoing force modernization and DIV 86 reorganization essentially said that in-opportune timing made the cure worse than the disease.

d. Implementation in Light Forces. By contrast with the heavy force experience, we did it right with the ID(L) conversion and can draw some valuable insights into implementation strategies.

(1) COHORT as a Mission Enhancer. In light divisions, we used the COHORT process to facilitate battalion activations and conversions and it worked extremely well. COHORT was seen as an enhancement to mission accomplishment rather than an impediment. While light forces were not burdened by the trauma of force modernization, they did experience a traumatic conversion to the AOE force design. The 7th ID(L) had the additional burdens of conducting the ID(L) certification and assuming an RDF mission. WRAIR has credited the COHORT process with holding the 7th ID(L) battalion and company sized units together through their period of high stress.

(2) COHORT by Division. In essence, we created three full COHORT divisions (7th, 10th, and 25th) during the ID(L) conversion and we learned that COHORT at division level is clearly a way to go. We learned that COHORT can be successfully managed at the division/installation level and many commanders like it. It provides for a consistent command climate, becomes an installation *modus operandi*, facilitates COHORT personnel management at every level from PERSCOM to the unit, allows for a division-level leader training program, and permits more efficient life cycle training management at all echelons. The stage is now set for an evaluation of battalion, brigade, and division training initiatives.

(3) Emergence of the Non-deploying Model. The most opportune outcome of the light force experience was the emergence of the Traditional Non-deploying COHORT Model as a viable steady-state candidate, something not envisioned in the initial concept. Because non-deploying models avoid many of the sources of non-acceptance by commanders (force structure rigidity, management complexity, readiness downtimes) they offer a whole new perspective on the viability and acceptability of the COHORT concept.

e. "We-They" Syndrome. All of the above factors contributed to a polarization of heavy versus light forces and generated a "we-they" syndrome at senior levels. Senior commanders today perceive that they are paying the bills for the success of the light infantry, which is, in large part, attributed to the COHORT process.

EVALUATION METHODOLOGY




Figure 17

f. Summary of Implementation Process. We learned a great deal from our implementation experiences to date. Our heavy force experience taught us what not to do (quasi-COHORT battalions, widespread proliferation of COHORT units, "have-have not" policies, and deployment models to Europe). By contrast, our light infantry experience gave us successes which we should exploit (COHORT by division, and non-deploying COHORT models). The combined experience tells us that we must work smarter to eliminate the causes of the "we-they" syndrome at the Army-level and the "have-have not" problem at the unit level if we want to succeed.

9. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY. With an implementation strategy designed to institutionalize the UMS without formal, comparative testing, the purpose of the evaluation was to identify and report systemic problems to the ARSTAF for solution and dissemination as Army policy. The methodology was based on the use of two mutually reinforcing approaches: The "dual filter" approach and the "fix-as-you-go" (FAYG) approach.

a. Dual Filters (Modeling and Field Evaluation). (Figure 17.) The rationale was to subject all candidate COHORT models to modeling analysis in a projected steady-state to ascertain sustainability and affordability, and to field evaluation to look at manageability, supportability, and acceptability. Over a 6-year period, the CAA conducted a total of six separate analyses of 12 different COHORT models while TRADOC and WRAIR evaluated four models and published 35 reports. The CAA analysis helped to eliminate many models from further consideration while the field evaluation identified two deployment models as infeasible for Europe (Company Replacement (18/18) and Battalion Rotation (36/36)). This modeling and evaluation process served us well, for as long as we used it. This experience proved the need for both filters to predict steady-state feasibility. In 1987, both modeling and field evaluation were terminated. Since then, we have been developing and expanding the UMS "in the blind", with no analysis or evaluation of the models currently fielded or steady-state planning on-going.

EVALUATION METHODOLOGY





Figure 18

b. Fix-As-You-Go. (Figure 18.) Although the COHORT System was to be implemented without comparative testing, field evaluation was deemed necessary to determine which model(s) were feasible. Because of the long term nature of the transition to COHORT, the length of COHORT model life cycles, and the complexity of the manning system, the only approach deemed practical was to field selected models, apply selected policies and procedures, evaluate for systemic problems, fix the problems, and continue the process. This approach was effective in those functional areas where it was applied, in that most systemic problems were identified, fixed and translated into Army regulation. This process, however, was not applied consistently to all functional areas over time. A perusal of Army regulations governing the NMS and UMS shows that personnel policy was the area of greatest activity with good results. The relative dearth of Army policy and procedure regarding training and readiness reflects the fact that we did not apply the methodology to these areas as extensively as we should have. Rather, it reflects that, in the end, COHORT was perceived to be a personnelist's operation, not a readiness enhancing program.

c. Consistency of Effort. One problem which did hamper the evaluation process was excessive shifting of focus, proponentcy, and scope. Over the course of 5 years, the focus shifted from systemic fix to COHORT/non-COHORT comparison, then to the impacts of transition. The HQDA directorate level proponentcy changed three times and TRADOC evaluation proponentcy shifted three times. The combined impact of all these changes was ambiguity of purpose, frequent abortion of initiatives, and an inadequate data base.

d. Summary of Evaluation Methodology. The methodology applied during the evaluation served us well. It has guided us towards institutionalization by providing a workable systemic change. It has shown us what works and what does not. This methodology is essential to continued progress in the evaluation of the UMS concept.

DYNAMICS OF COHESION



WRAIR STUDIES ON COHESION

STUDY POPULATION

- 450 Man-days of unit activity observed
- 37,000 Surveys conducted
- 8,500 Soldiers interviewed
- 1,800 Groups interviewed
- 1,000 Family members interviewed
- 94 COHORT Bn & Co observed
- 60 Non-COHORT Bn & Co observed
- 6 Type units and MACOMS

Figure 19

10. PERFORMANCE OF COHORT UNITS.

a. Although the field evaluation methodology focused primarily on systemic issues (the means to the end), some efforts were made to measure the end results by comparing the performance of COHORT and non-COHORT units. Generally, attempts to compare empirically the training effectiveness and the collective and individual proficiency of units were inconclusive. The only credible assessments came from the subjective judgments of subject matter experts and the chains of command based on cohesion indicators and perceptions of performance. These are, however, convincing indicators. If more objective comparisons are desired, we must better define issues, criteria, and measures of effectiveness; gather data under more controlled conditions; and analyze to determine the reasons for differences and trends, with the view towards isolating the COHORT variable.

b. Cohesion. The most comprehensive and meaningful body of data to emerge from the COHORT evaluation process to date is the research conducted by WRAIR in the areas of cohesion, leadership, family support, and soldier perceptions of readiness, training, and operational effectiveness. The quality of their data base is a tribute to the professionalism of the WRAIR researchers. The WRAIR focus has been primarily on soldier-leader-family interactions, and on their perceptions of Army and unit life. WRAIR is the only agency to have followed COHORT units consistently from 1982 to date and draws from a large and credible data base (figure 19). WRAIR findings on cohesion are consistent across all COHORT models and MACOMs.

(1) Horizontal Bonding - First Termers. WRAIR found that the process of recruiting first term soldiers for the same COHORT unit, training them together in OSUT, and keeping them together for their entire first enlistment is potentially a powerful and effective combat multiplier. This process molded COHORT first termers into a cohesive, synergistic combat force whose potential could be exploited by trained leadership. WRAIR analysis showed two important sub-categories of horizontal bonding: peer support and fighting teamwork. WRAIR data also showed a decline in cohesion over the 3-year unit life cycle. The reasons for the downward trend appeared

COHORT MODEL CHARACTERISTICS

<u>CHARACTERISTIC</u>	<u>TRADITIONAL MODEL</u>	<u>SUSTAINED MODEL</u>
ECHELON	BN OR CO	BN OR CO
CONUS OR OCONUS	EITHER	EITHER
DEPLOYER OR NON-DEPLOYER	EITHER	NON-DEPLOYER
TYPE LIFE CYCLE	FIXED	CONTINUOUS
LIFE CYCLE DURATION	3 YEARS	INFINITE
ESTABLISH/DISESTABLISH DATES	YES	NO
LEADER TRAINING PROGRAM	YES	NO
ASSIGNMENT WINDOW INTERVAL	36 MONTHS *	4 OR 12 MONTHS
INDIVIDUAL STABILIZATION PERIOD	36 MONTHS	4 OR 12 MONTHS

* HAS ANNUAL REPLACEMENT OF UNPROGRAMMED LOSSES ONLY (NO REASSIGNMENTS)

Figure 20

to be related to the absence of progressive unit training programs and the lack of COHORT-specific leader training programs. The good news however, is that, despite this downward curve, first term COHORT soldiers consistently displayed significantly higher levels of horizontal bonding than did non-COHORT first termers, when samples were controlled for time. First term horizontal bonding was found to be relatively independent of the quality of leadership and command climate.

(2) Horizontal Bonding Among Leaders. COHORT leaders generally displayed stronger horizontal bonding than did non-COHORT leaders. Leader bonding was not as strong as first term bonding because leaders were not as stabilized. Officers remained on the IRS, and NCO's, although more stabilized than officers, were frequently moved because enforcement of stabilization rules varied widely. Leader bonding was strongest in Traditional COHORT units for two reasons: the more effective NCO stabilization policies of that model, and the formal leader training that accompanied most units on Traditional Models (especially COHORT battalions in the light infantry). (Figure 20.)

(3) Vertical Bonding. Although not as strong and consistent as the bonding of first termers, the bonding between first term soldiers and their leaders was generally stronger in COHORT units than non-COHORT units. WRAIR findings show vertical bonding was sensitive to the echelon of the leader, the quality of leadership, and leader stability. Bonding was strongest at the squad leader level and weakened further up the chain of command. It appeared to be directly proportional to leader stability (although this observation has not been quantified). It developed most strongly with leaders who placed greater emphasis on human dimensions and collective skills. WRAIR reports that soldier bonding with leaders appeared to be most sensitive to how the soldiers perceived two particular leader traits: technical competence and the leader's sense of caring. (WRAIR also reported that the spouses' perception of the soldiers' leaders strongly influenced their attitudes towards the Army as a career.)

(4) Organizational Bonding. The degree to which first term soldiers displayed a sense of esprit and identification with the unit was related to both vertical and horizontal bonding. It appeared as a

synergistic outcome of overall unit cohesion, concerned leadership, and meaningful training activities. Organizational bonding flourished in those units whose commanders tended to demonstrate, by nature, a philosophical appreciation for the intangible human dimensions of combat power such as soldier will and cohesion.

(5) Soldier-Leader Interaction. One strong and consistent observation of the COHORT process was that the effects of leader actions were highly amplified and resulted in polarized perceptions of leaders in COHORT units. Since the first termers' group was tightly bonded, soldiers tended to think and act as a group. Anything, good or bad, that affected one soldier was likely to influence the entire squad or platoon. In the non-COHORT environment, leader actions tended to affect only the soldier involved or another buddy or two. COHORT soldiers got to know their leaders more thoroughly and tended to categorize them toward one end or the other on the spectrum of competence, and responded accordingly.

(6) Family Support. WRAIR studies show that, across all models studied, COHORT units developed family support groups more systematically, more consistently and with greater effect than did non-COHORT units. Many non-COHORT family support groups were pro forma organizations with no real impact on families. COHORT spouses reported a higher sense of morale and cohesion than did spouses of non-COHORT soldiers. The group that experienced the greatest benefit from family support networks were spouses of first term COHORT soldiers, who reported that distaff interactions facilitated their transition into Army life and helped them cope with frequent and protracted absences of their spouses. Incidentally, the 1988 Army Family Survey found first term families to be in greatest need of support and these same families believe that their leaders do less for them. Family support groups in the COHORT environment were most effective when allowed to develop spontaneously and operate on an informal, voluntary basis. Sponsorship activities were also found to be more organized and effective in COHORT units than non-COHORT units. The Army Family Survey also cites sponsorship as a problem area Army-wide.

c. Unit Training. Contrary to the thoroughness and consistency of the human dimensions evaluation of COHORT, the field evaluation of the "T" in COHORT has proven to be of limited value. Despite considerable activity in this area, the Army has no body of relevant empirical data which compares the training aspects of COHORT and non-COHORT units in a meaningful way. Initially, when the evaluation was FAYG, the focus was on systemic issues with emphasis on personnel management, external stabilization, and the formation of units. Later, when the field evaluation became comparative in nature, attention turned to the collection of data on individual performance indicators such as APFT, SQT, and individual weapons qualification (IWQ) scores which were readily collectible and easily quantifiable. Some comparisons were made of collective performance such as the ARTEP, EDRE, ORT, Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection (NWTI), and crew-served weapons qualifications. These were deemed inconclusive for reasons discussed below.

(1) Individual Performance Indicators. In the analysis of all individual performance indicators, there are sufficient questions concerning the legitimacy of the analysis to render the data inconclusive. The greater concern regards two variables not addressed in the evaluation: iterative dependent testing scores and unit training management. In the first case, only the final pass/fail numbers were reported. The data base does not reflect the soldier's numerical score or the number of times he took the APFT or SQT, or tried the qualification course before passing. Only his final pass/fail notation is recorded. The result was very high pass rates across the board with no significant discrimination among units or individuals. To be more discriminating and meaningful, the criteria should have used a first-try numerical score attained, as opposed to a final pass/fail notation. The second concern is equally important. Command approaches to training for SQT, IWQ, and APFT varied so widely that a comparison of battalions was not very meaningful. Some COHORT units took these tests in stride (no dedicated practice time was scheduled). By contrast, at least one non-COHORT battalion dedicated weeks of repetitive practice to the SQT. Also, these events were not evaluated in the context of the COHORT unit life cycle or the overall battalion training program of either COHORT or non-COHORT units. Thus, the impacts of mitigating factors, such as life cycle startup, DIV 86, MTOE conversion, and force

modernization were not addressed. Finally, there had been no COHORT-specific training strategies uniformly developed or applied to either the COHORT companies of the quasi-COHORT battalions or the rotating COHORT battalions. COHORT units were training under IRS modalities and the potential of the COHORT unit life cycles was not exploited. In the 7th and 10th ID(L), where a better picture of the COHORT training environment could have been captured, full scale evaluation was not undertaken, although WRAIR did examine the human factors of the 7th ID(L) extensively.

(2) Collective Performance Indicators. Over the course of the field evaluation, there were several attempts to compare COHORT and non-COHORT units in terms of collective performance indicators. These efforts proved unsuccessful because of the approach taken and the criteria used. During the battalion rotation phase, COHORT and non-COHORT battalions were compared in terms of ARTEP, EDRE, NWTI, and ORT results. Although sample sizes were adequate for comparison, the results were inconclusive because there was a virtual 100 percent pass rate for all units on all exercises. Additionally, there was no standardization of either conditions or measures among the various commands that administered these evaluations. Only a final pass or fail score was recorded. Comparisons were also made of crew-served weapons qualifications scores (M1 tank, M2 BFV/CFV, TOW, Dragon, M60 MG) with similar results. Final pass/fail results were recorded and a number of contaminating external variables were not addressed (the one-time startup transition from a non-COHORT to a COHORT battalion, the timing of qualification firing in relation to unit formation or deployment, the transition from M113 to M2 vehicles, and the differences in MACOM range facilities and gunnery training standards). Failure to consider these variables resulted in an incomplete analysis and little discrimination among scores.

(3) Unit Training Trends. With a proper battalion-level COHORT training program in place, one might expect commanders to conduct more efficient individual training because all first term soldiers are at the same level of training proficiency at the same time, and commanders do not have to repeat training tasks frequently to accommodate the continued trickle of new faces. One might also expect that, by aligning cohesive leaders and first termers, individual skills would improve because of the more stable and consistent

interface between soldier and mentor. Additionally, collective training should be progressively more complex, challenging, and realistic in the stable COHORT unit. These trends could have been measured by an analysis of training programs and schedules and distribution of training resources expended. In 1985, TRADOC attempted to compare COHORT and non-COHORT units by analyzing their distribution of training time in terms of administrative, maintenance, collective and individual training time. The results did not prove useful, however, because of the approach taken to data collection and analysis. The failure to address qualitative subject content, unit life cycles, and other major training events renders the evaluation effort inconclusive. Additionally, the use of soldier manhours of training introduced a variable which confused the analysis. This effort was aborted in 1986 and the results were never analyzed or reported. The methodology, however, is sound and should be used if evaluation is resumed.

d. Leader Training. WRAIR reports that to the extent that COHORT leaders recognized and exploited the potential of COHORT, they were highly successful.

(1) The value of a leader training program for COHORT units has been established by WRAIR and chain of command feedback. These programs serve the following purposes: teach leaders about the COHORT process and how to develop cohesion; allow NCO's who have been away from troops to become "re-greened", improve their physical fitness, refresh their technical and tactical skills; and to develop horizontal bonding among unit leaders. In light infantry units, the Light Fighters Course was effective in building teamwork and cohesion among leaders (according to the leaders). In heavy units where formal leader training was generally not conducted as part of the COHORT life cycle, leader effectiveness varied widely according to WRAIR. WRAIR feedback indicates that COHORT leaders must be trained to recognize the dynamics of cohesion in order to harness the potential of the stable COHORT unit environment. ARI has developed and fielded a generic "Leadership for the 90's" program which teaches leaders to develop cohesion and stability. It has been field tested and is currently being integrated into the Light Leaders Course in the 10th ID(L). It could serve as a pilot program for application to all COHORT units.

(2) Although a Sustained COHORT Model does not lend itself to a model-based leader training program for individual units, leader training could be supported at the installation level if the entire division were COHORT, as with the 7th and 10th ID(L). Divisions with a sprinkling of COHORT companies cannot institutionalize a COHORT leader training program efficiently. Further development of COHORT leader training is clearly warranted, given the potential payoff of such a program and its obvious tie-in to the philosophies espoused by FM 25-100.

e. Stability and Turbulence. From the outset, the Army focus has been on policies to control external (PERSCOM induced losses and gains to the unit) turbulence with the assumption that commanders would intuitively control internal turbulence, thus, optimizing the COHORT unit environment. The field evaluation contains only limited snapshots of Army attrition (unprogrammed losses to the Army, retention, and external turbulence).

(1) Attrition. Attrition was found to be approximately one percent per month for COHORT and non-COHORT samples alike. The data base contains only a 13-month snapshot of attrition in COHORT units on the Company Replacement Model with inconclusive results. Most of the data was not normalized for demographics, test conditions were not recorded, and no reasons were recorded for the differences displayed.

(2) Retention and Reenlistment. The small sample of retention data reflected lower retention rates for COHORT soldiers, especially married first termers. However, reasons for the differences were not recorded nor were the test conditions, and no conclusions could be drawn. Reenlistment data was not collected.

(3) External Turbulence. The field evaluation compared the external turbulence of units on the Battalion Rotation Model with a non-COHORT baseline and found that the COHORT units experienced significantly lower external turbulence than did the non-COHORT baseline. Across the board, the data base shows that first termers were effectively stabilized for their entire enlistment period, that NCO turbulence was high because stabilization policies were not well enforced, and that officers remained on the IRS.

(4) Officer Turbulence. Evaluation feedback points to officer turbulence as a chronic and significant problem. In addition to hampering development of vertical and organizational bonding, there were frequently reported feelings of resentment among NCOs who felt the pressures of protracted field duty and perceived themselves as "locked in" to the COHORT unit, while officers moved in and out of positions frequently in the name of career enhancement.

(5) Internal Turbulence. Some data on internal turbulence was collected on COHORT companies but not reported. No evaluation was conducted to measure internal turbulence or to compare COHORT and non-COHORT units. A limited study by ARI indicated that there are approximately 2.7 internal moves for every external move in combat arms units, and that internal turbulence in heavy forces was just as high in COHORT units as in non-COHORT units (neither ARI nor WRAIR surveyed the light infantry). Because internal turbulence was not controlled, the stability of COHORT units during the field evaluation was less than that envisioned in the concept. Internal stability can be mandated but not centrally enforced. It is the purview of the division commander, and can best be controlled by division (or lower) level policy. The need for, and value of, internal stability should be taught in the schoolhouse and become an inbred leader objective.

f. Combat Readiness. Although operational readiness is the "OR" in COHORT and readiness is the ultimate purpose of the UMS, there is a surprising disparity of views among leaders regarding the impacts of COHORT on the readiness of units. To understand the polarization of views, we must understand the two dimensions of the readiness issue: the first is the combat proficiency of the COHORT units themselves; the second refers to the impacts of COHORT implementation on the overall force readiness. Each merits separate discussion.

(1) COHORT as a Readiness Enhancer. Past evaluation efforts have produced no empirical data which compares the combat effectiveness or readiness of COHORT and non-COHORT units, either directly or indirectly.

(a) There is, however, a significant and credible body of subjective chain of command judgement from officers, such as Bill Harrison, Ed Burba, Bill Carpenter, Pete Boylan, Charlie Otstott, George Fisher, Jack Kean, Dave Blodgett, Dave Meade, and Dick Seitz, who have commanded or observed COHORT units in action from individual companies to full COHORT divisions. To date, the stronger proponents of COHORT are light infantrymen who have seen COHORT operate under relatively favorable conditions and consider COHORT to be a strong and necessary combat multiplier. In the 7th ID(L), the WRAIR research credits the COHORT process with literally holding the units together as combat ready entities despite the unprecedented external pressures imposed on the division during its intense period of reorganization, downsizing, re-equipping, light infantry division certification, and attainment of RDF status. Today, Bill Harrison is one of the Army's most ardent advocates of the COHORT concept as a result of his experience as a COHORT division commander.

(b) As a generalization, chain of command feedback to WRAIR indicated that COHORT units were found to be more technically and tactically proficient, more synergistic and cohesive, more psychologically resistant to the potential shock of initial combat, and more willing to fight than non-COHORT units. These findings are consistent with historical studies of World War II which link stability and unit integrity to cohesion, morale, and esprit. During the build-up, we raised divisions in CONUS and introduced trained, cohesive units into the theater and generally kept troops in their units for long periods. Throughout the war, we tried different approaches to sustaining the force. Over time, commanders such as GEN Stillwell, came to recognize the need to keep soldiers together by "packaging the pipeline". By war's end, the War Department was moving towards group-oriented replacement policies. Twenty years later, we introduced combat forces into Vietnam in a similar manner; by stabilizing, training, and fielding cohesive units. By contrast, however, we consciously destroyed the cohesiveness and readiness of those units even before the first battle. Our policy of "infusion" was designed to stagger soldiers' DEROS dates to support manageability of the 1 year tour policy. This is an interesting study in contrasts. In World War II, commanders recognized the need for stability and cohesion and strived for it, but were frustrated by the complexities of the personnel system from fully attaining it. In

KICKSTART

Establishing a COHORT unit by reassigning most of the soldiers out of that unit and refilling it at one time with soldiers who can be stabilized in that unit for a prescribed period.

Vietnam, we didn't even try for it. The tail wagged the dog from the outset, aggravated by very short command tours. Many of us still remember vividly the impacts of personnel turbulence in Vietnam.

(c) While neither TEXCOM nor WRAIR studied the 10th ID(L), ARI conducted some limited assessments on the Division, and found that small units exhibited a sense of rhythm, clockwork and smoothness in collective tactical tasks not found in non-COHORT units. In heavy forces, where COHORT was not implemented well, WRAIR data finds that the COHORT companies in heavy non-COHORT battalions were generally considered better units. This assessment applied to those units that were not well accepted or assimilated due to resentments caused by implementation actions which resulted in actual or perceived privileged treatment.

(2) COHORT as a Readiness Detractor. COHORT is seen by some as detrimental to readiness for a variety of reasons, most of which are related to factors other than the actual performance of units. The reasons are:

(a) Readiness Downtime. COHORT models have specific life cycle nodes which cause temporary readiness downtime (e.g., startup, disestablishment, deployment, reload windows). Many believe, based on the prevailing USR mind-set, that we cannot afford a steady-state system in which units have scheduled downtimes as part of life cycle management. This issue has never been fully addressed and needs to be.

(b) Transition Trauma. The process of transitioning a non-COHORT unit into any COHORT model entails some unavoidable "duffle-bag drag" in order to align soldiers' ETS and DEROS dates. This is a one-time startup phenomenon and the degree of turbulence varies by COHORT model and the manner of transition (i.e., kickstart a unit or ease into alignment). Many commanders, especially those simultaneously undergoing force modernization and DIV 86 reorganization felt that the cumulative burden of all these transitional initiatives was too traumatic for unit readiness. These commanders judged the readiness impact of COHORT on the transitional process rather than the steady-state operational performance of the unit.

(c) The Bill-Payers. As we have expanded the UMS, COHORT units have been formed and stabilized at the expense of non-COHORT units, which has caused some senior commanders to feel that their overall force readiness has declined, because they are paying the bill for light infantry COHORT in terms of lower strength levels and higher turbulence. This view, while legitimate, has been a function of transition. It may prove to be a systemic issue if we do not resume long range planning. It argues for a resumption of steady-state sustainability analysis, a revision of our implementation strategy, and a change to the perception that overstrength is a COHORT prerequisite.

g. Summary of COHORT Unit Performance.

(1) We have gained significant insights into the dynamics of cohesion and leadership in COHORT units and we know that strong soldier bonding is achievable. We understand the importance of COHORT leader training and its consistency with the tenets of FM 25-100. We have learned that officers must be part of the stabilization process. We can see the potential of COHORT to help resolve many of the problems and perceptions that concern Army families today. We understand both sides of the COHORT unit readiness issue and we know what must be done to develop and export effective training strategies.

(2) Unfortunately, we have no usable body of empirical data in the areas of attrition, retention, reenlistment, stability, training effectiveness, or unit proficiency - but we know why. In retrospect, there is strength in the variety of tests we ran even though there were negatives. The Army is big enough to let the chips fall where they may and learn from its mistakes. We have learned enough about the field evaluation process to know why we did not obtain the desired results and are now in a better position to focus on the right issues, criteria and measures should we resume evaluation.

11. THE SYSTEMIC FOCUS. The FAYG process was successful in that most systemic problems that were surfaced during the evaluation were fixed and captured in AR 600-83, The Unit Manning System.

a. The most successful systemic initiatives undertaken are: the management of first term COHORT soldiers; development of the COHORT Integration Model (CIM); and enactment of the Variable Enlistment Legislation.

(1) Management of COHORT First Termers. The Army has mastered the process of accessing, training, and delivering first term COHORT soldiers to the right place at the right time as a cohesive group. The results of this system (strong horizontal bonding) speak for themselves. USAREC has been innovative and responsive in meeting COHORT goals over the years. PERSCOM has been highly consistent and reliable in managing the overall COHORT first term requirements. The training centers have generally been successful in maintaining COHORT group integrity and interfacing with MACOMs. The primary limitation to this process has been the lack of adequate automation support to do it more efficiently.

(2) The CIM. This unit "ramp-up" model evolved over the years as an automated system for integrating numerous Army management systems (i.e., TAADS, ATRRS, etc.) with COHORT model designs and producing a proposed COHORT unit schedule which is supportable and consistent with accession constraints and training base capacity. The principal limitation to this model is that the rules address only personnel factors and do not consider such operational constraints as brigade organization and NTC rotation schedules. This can be easily changed, however, and must be.

(3) VEL. This change in recruiting legislation is a classic example of the FAYG methodology which has proven indispensable to our success to date. Without VEL, the efficient design of COHORT models and management of COHORT units would be extremely difficult, if not infeasible. Consideration should be given to applying VEL to the rest of the non-COHORT Army as well. It is a well received option which keeps soldiers in the force longer and facilitates management of the seasonal flow of accessions.

b. It has always been acknowledged that the greatest challenge to institutionalizing the COHORT system would be the steady-state management of the personnel flow. Highlighted here are two salient chronic COHORT management problems yet unresolved: late arrival of cadre to COHORT units; and COHORT unit strength profiles. The

first is a management problem. The second is a policy and perception problem.

(1) Late Arrival of Cadre. Across the board, field evaluation data has shown a chronic inability of PERSCOM and installations to fill COHORT cadre requirements in a timely manner. This problem existed (and still does today) across all MACOMs and all COHORT models, although we have done better in supporting the light divisions than we have the heavy forces. To some degree it is a function of the expedient off-line management process for COHORT, compounded by the need to micro-manage a wide proliferation of individual COHORT companies. This problem has affected the cohesion-building process, as well as the effectiveness of leaders who begin their tour of duty behind the power curve. We need to work this problem smarter and solve it before we expand the COHORT schedule much further.


(2) Unit Strength Profiles.

(a) This is probably the most divisive management problem confronting the UMS because it has contributed to the "we-they" syndrome and appears to be the most challenging systemic problem we face as we expand COHORT. COHORT units are perceived to be manned and maintained at higher strength levels than non-COHORT units. This situation came about for two reasons: First, as we began to field COHORT we did not know how unit strengths would fluctuate along the COHORT "sawtooth" profile, so we overfilled the units and kept the strength floors high for fear of the USSR. Over time, a perception developed that equated the COHORT concept with fenced, overstrength units. Secondly, we manned the light divisions at higher levels than heavy forces initially because they were light infantry, not because they were COHORT. This reinforced the misperception that COHORT units must be overstrength to work.

(b) This development led the "have not" commanders to resist COHORT, and the Army managers to conclude that COHORT is unaffordable. We need to relook the strength profile issue from a different perspective. Conceptually, if cohesion and stability are good, then a COHORT unit should be better than a non-COHORT unit of

equal or greater strength, other things being equal. Taken one step further, COHORT could be viewed as a no-cost combat multiplier to off-set the impacts of reduced force levels in the future. If we continue the COHORT program, we should review our policies on COHORT strength profiles and clarify them for the field in order to dispel the misperception that COHORT is causing manpower shortfalls in heavy divisions.

c. Summary of Systemic Focus: Clearly, we have made great strides in learning how to manage the COHORT process. Without a resumption of a systemic oriented evaluation process, however continued progress will be difficult. Simply put, the single most challenging leadership problem to overcome is to sustain the flow of soldiers and leaders into and out of COHORT units in a manner that does not penalize the non-COHORT force. The starting point for accomplishing that task is to readdress the issue of COHORT unit strength profiles, from a conceptual as well as a leadership perspective, and devise a training strategy in concert with the principles of FM 25-100.



12. ASSESSMENT OF THE UMS TODAY.

a. Having analyzed our previous involvement with the UMS, we must now assess the current program in light of the lessons drawn from the past and make judgements about our status and prognosis for success.

b. The UMS Concept. Over time, the pendulum of concept definition has swung from unit rotation/replacement with firm stabilization rules within a Regimental framework, to a Package Replacement System with no real stabilization and decoupling of the COHORT and Regimental Systems. While the original NMS was too ambitious for the Army, the current UMS concept appears to have drifted to the other extreme. As presently defined and implemented, the UMS is little better than the Individual Replacement System. Somewhere in between is a balanced definition of the UMS which provides the stability and cohesion we seek on one hand, and the manageability we need on the other. That balance still appears to be both viable and attainable.

c. The Regimental System. Today, the Regimental concept, originally conceived as a sub-set of the UMS, does not appear to be working as envisioned, despite considerable Regimental activity.

(1) While the Army position officially cites affiliation as a primary assignment consideration, in practice, this appears not to be the case (with the possible exception of command slating). Based on informal feedback from personnelists at various echelons, Regimental affiliation ranks so low on the long list of assignment considerations that soldiers rarely, if ever, are assigned on that basis. The extent to which expectations have been raised and disappointments suffered by soldiers and families is unknown because the notion of affiliation as a career incentive has not been surveyed. Likewise, the readiness enhancing potential of affiliation has never been evaluated. In essence, the Army is expending a lot of management time to administer a program that has no tangible impact and whose contribution to readiness is uncertain. In this sense, the viability of the Regimental affiliation concept has not materialized though the potential for benefit may seem high, especially for soldiers and leaders with up to 6 years of service.

(2) When the original plan was changed to keep colors on active duty, the value of this initiative was diluted. While better aligned than before, the current Regimental structure does not fully support PERSCOM's ability to manage soldiers within their affiliated Regiments. In the Korea unit replacement scheme, for example, there are no CONUS-OCONUS Regimental linkages. As with affiliation, we appear to have launched an initiative, but may not be

accruing the benefits. However, until we know more about the degree of soldier receptivity to the affiliation program, the Regimental structure should remain as is.

(3) The ceremonial enhancements program is very well received, is highly beneficial to those commanders who take advantage of it, and operates smoothly. It has served to link active duty soldiers with retiree and veteran associations in highly constructive ways. Additionally, informal feedback tells us that ceremonial enhancements are working for the CS/CSS forces who are enjoying greater esprit. This program should be continued.

(4) The promise of a homebase for the soldier and his family has quietly faded. Today, homebasing is not even mentioned as a part of the UMS although the program was never formally terminated. The potential exists for homebasing soldiers who truly wish to specialize and to establish geographic roots early in their careers. The machine systems of the Army can accommodate homebasing, however, we do not know the extent to which we can, or want, to offer homebasing because we are not addressing it. As a minimum, we should examine the feasibility and extent of Army-wide desirability of homebasing before declaring the concept dead.

d. The COHORT System.

(1) The philosophical dimensions of the COHORT concept, as discussed earlier in this report, are not acknowledged or addressed formally in the program today. All the pieces of the COHORT concept must be developed, articulated, and fielded together before a meaningful judgement can be made regarding the COHORT concept.


(2) In contrast to Regimental initiatives, COHORT models have been subjected to considerable evaluation and analysis. We have made great strides in some areas but are regressing in others. Today, non-deploying COHORT models prevail, which is a major positive outcome of the evaluation process. They should continue to be the focus of our efforts. Our treatment of specific COHORT models and stabilization rules, however, is undermining all we have gained. We are phasing out one of the most promising models fielded (the Traditional non-deploying battalion), trying to phase out the other most promising model (Sustained - PRS-12), and

proliferating, as the predominant COHORT model, one with only token stabilization (Sustained - PRS-4). All this is being done with neither field evaluation nor analysis. This course of action is inconsistent with what we have learned of the COHORT process to date. The three COHORT models mentioned above are all potentially feasible as steady-state models. To be meaningful, however, Sustained COHORT Models must be redefined to incorporate more meaningful stabilization rules.

(3) Based on MACOM views of the Korea COHORT scheme, a review of that program seems prudent to ensure that what we are doing makes sense.

e. Evaluation. Today, after 7 years, the Army is divided over the worth of the UMS and we lack the analytical basis for either terminating or institutionalizing the program. Without further evaluation and analysis, we cannot rationalize either course of action. There is currently no evaluation or analysis on-going. Although our past evaluation efforts have not been totally successful, we have learned enough about the dynamics of this program to design a more meaningful evaluation and construct more useful issues, criteria and measures of effectiveness. If the decision is to continue the UMS, a resumption of the evaluation process is necessary to help us chart our course.

f. Implementation. By default, the present implementation strategy is to institutionalize the UMS by putting the program on auto-pilot, disestablishing the UMS management cell, and expanding the PRS without further evaluation. The Phase I expansion plan has undergone two major changes in COHORT model design in the past year (elimination of the "Otis Model" of kickstart COHORT companies formed in FORSCOM and deployed to USAREUR on a one-time basis; and elimination of quasi-COHORT battalions in FORSCOM). Both of these changes were made without the benefit of field evaluation, modeling analysis, or a long range vision of the steady-state against which to judge the impacts. The Phase I plan projects expansion to approximately 300 COHORT companies by FY 92. Phase II of the current expansion will be, by default, a straight line projection of Phase I expansion, again without the benefit of evaluation feedback. This approach assumes that we are on the best course and need no transition mechanisms to guide us into the steady-state. The current plan, however, continues some of the more serious problems which have hindered progress in the past:



LEGEND

- COHORT UNIT
PRS-4
- NON-COHORT
UNIT

Figure 21

(1) The perception of inequitable strength policies for COHORT and non-COHORT units continues to fuel a "we-they" syndrome between heavy and light force commanders. This misperception appears to be aggravated by some confusion regarding the actual manning policies applicable to specific COHORT models and units. Clarification of strength profiles is necessary in order to overcome the misperception.

(2) The random proliferation of COHORT units and quasi-COHORT battalions precludes effective operation of the COHORT process. For example, the 8th ID has 12 COHORT companies scattered throughout nine quasi-COHORT battalions. Not one battalion in the division is fully COHORT (figure 21). FORSCOM has recently requested elimination of quasi-COHORT battalions. (DA has approved and changed the COHORT schedule to eliminate all non-deploying quasi-COHORT battalions, USAREUR desires to do likewise. The Korea scheme retains some quasi-COHORT battalions). While moving to full-up COHORT battalions is a good move, the remaining COHORT battalions are still scattered throughout the Army in a random pattern, especially in heavy divisions. The current expansion plan should be revised to reflect the lessons we have learned about the viability of the COHORT process in a divisional environment. While the revised schedule should be driven by many factors, the predominant consideration should be the requirement for field evaluation of the COHORT models chosen for further consideration.

g. In summary, the overall UMS concept is in need of redefinition with the view towards refocusing in the direction of the original goals of the program. Little can be said for the viability of the Regimental System since it has never been studied or evaluated, although we appear to be going through the motions of affiliation and designation, with little apparent benefit, and homebasing is in limbo. By contrast, the ceremonial enhancement program is paying off and should be expanded. We have made significant strides in development of the COHORT System, especially with the emergence of non-deploying COHORT models, the success of COHORT at division level, and the management of first term COHORT soldiers. However, we are presently operating "in the blind" with the lack of transition mechanisms, such as a long range plan, field evaluation and modeling analysis, and are drifting off-course. Unless we make some adjustments to the program, we will not succeed.

13. TRANSITION MANAGEMENT.


a. Setting the Course. Transition from the IRS to the UMS was initially projected to take 8-10 years. Initially, we began with a steady-state description of the system we envisioned, set a long term course which focused on the systematic change of policy, procedure, and regulation as the FAYG process helped us to refine the COHORT models over time. We put management mechanisms in place and pursued both the COHORT and Regimental Systems aggressively. Over time, that approach was overtaken by the dynamics of force modernization, the AOE redesign, and other factors. We drifted away from our long range focus to the point that presently there is no long range plan for reaching a steady-state UMS nor is there any analysis or evaluation on-going.

b. Army Proponency and the Manning Task Force (MTF). In 1981, the DCSPER was charged with Army proponency and a MTF was established to orchestrate transition. The MTF was a multi-disciplined team of conceptualizers and catalysts that reported directly to the DCSPER. By design, they operated off-line. Their role was to look at the Army establishment with a view towards changing it. To accomplish this mission, they had to be independent of the bureaucracy and have responsive channels of communication to key decision-makers who were receptive to self-change. This process was effective until 1984, when the MTF was "institutionalized" as a division within a directorate of the ODCSPER where it became a part of the bureaucracy and lost its effectiveness as a catalyst for systemic change. The UMS became a "personnel-only" program and the system has regressed in definition back towards the status quo. Today, in the name of institutionalization, even that office has been disestablished. The need still exists for a dedicated management cell to orchestrate the long term transition process. Because readiness is the ultimate focus of the UMS and training is the key to success, the DCSOPS is the logical ARSTAF proponent, with the DCSPER in the support role. The UMS cell should report directly to him and the DCSPER.

c. Roles and Responsibilities. There are four principal functions which must be addressed during the Army's overall transition to the

UMS: concept, policy and procedure, UMS management, and evaluation and analysis. We are at a juncture in the program where a realignment of these functions has occurred by consensus among four key players: DCSPER, DCSOPS, TRADOC, and PERSCOM. A memorandum of agreement is being negotiated among these players which breaks out the principal roles and responsibilities as follows:

UNIT MANNING SYSTEM



(1) Concept. This is the development, articulation, and continual refinement of the conceptual parameters of the COHORT and Regimental Systems. From 1981 to date, the DCSPER was the keeper of the concept. Presently, TRADOC has assumed that role with DCSPER concurrence and should retain it as the Army's architect of the future. Development of doctrine and concepts are more appropriately the domain of TRADOC, rather than the ARSTAF. In this capacity, TRADOC would recommend changes to the UMS concept based on feedback from evaluation and analysis.

(2) Policy and Procedure. This is the translation of concept into Army policy and procedure via regulations and directives through Army staff coordination. This has always been an ARSTAF role with the DCSPER as the principal agent. The ARSTAF should retain that role, but overall Army proponentcy should shift to the DCSOPS. The DCSPER should be responsible only for personnel policy.



MANNING SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS




Figure 22

(3) UMS Management. This is the routine day-to-day management of the COHORT and Regimental affiliation programs, to include: accession and training of COHORT soldiers, execution of the COHORT unit schedule, and assignment of affiliated soldiers. Until recently, this function was managed by the MTF with PERSCOM assisting. Currently, it is a PERSCOM responsibility. It should remain so, but the ODCSOPS must become involved in matters pertaining to COHORT unit models and schedules because of their impacts on readiness and the USR reporting system.

(4) Evaluation. This is the field evaluation and modeling analysis of UMS initiatives, to include COHORT models, Regimental initiatives, and their impacts on units, soldiers, families, installations, and MACOM's. This was, and should continue to be, a TRADOC responsibility, with assistance from WRAIR and ARI.

d. The Manning System Requirements (MSR) Process. In order to maintain a clear audit trail of UMS evolution, a formal tasking mechanism was emplaced for developing and tasking UMS initiatives within the ARSTAF. In total, seven MSR documents were dispatched (figure 22). In every case, the required initiative was fully developed and executed by the recipient ARSTAF element. When this mechanism was discontinued in 1984, momentum slowed and other major initiatives, such as development of training strategies, readiness models, and wartime sustainment policies never got off the ground. As with the MTF, the MSR process was a proven mechanism that worked well and should be resumed.

e. Changing Mind-Sets. In retrospect, we underestimated the magnitude of the prevailing cultural mind-set about the IRS, and the bureaucratic inertia that had to be overcome. Also, we did not foresee the perception problems that arose during implementation. The lack of a comprehensive marketing program and feedback network for information flow contributed to widespread misunderstanding of the concept and non-support for the program. Some manifestations of the attitudinal roadblocks are:

(1) "Me-First" Orientation. The post-Vietnam environment has carried the IRS pendulum to the point that the prevailing Army culture nurtures an IRS based on the primacy of the individual over

the unit. Since the UMS is a unit-oriented concept, many COHORT and Regimental initiatives are perceived as restrictive, unfair, and career-damaging.

(2) Status Quo. The IRS is a management system of least resistance. The UMS restricts management flexibility and curtails command prerogatives. (Inertia seems to give way to innovative thinking, however, when the entire division is COHORT, commanders can see the payoff). On installations with randomly scattered COHORT companies, status quo remains the modus operandi and COHORT is often tolerated as a transitory experiment.

(3) The USR Mentality. The USR system is both a cause and a reflection of the "level of fill" approach to readiness (as opposed to the quality of performance) which has become inbred. FM 25-100 doctrinal philosophies have yet to be placed in the USR context. This mind-set will not change until we change the USR system to recognize and reward stability, cohesion, and collective proficiency as readiness enhancers. FM 25-100 is the bridge to success here.

(4) The "Show-Me" Group. These commanders and staffers want clear, empirical proof that the UMS is sustainable, affordable, and quantifiably better than the IRS. This has not been done to date. If subjective command judgement is not an adequate basis for adopting the UMS, then much work needs to be done to quantify combat effectiveness and readiness in terms that the Army has not yet been able to do.

(5) Test Orientation. Many field commanders and staffers have viewed the UMS as a limited experiment that will go away with time. The tendency has been to tolerate the experiment with off-line fixes as exceptions to policy or regulation. Only persistent adherence to a systemic methodology will overcome this mind-set.

(6) Imbalanced Perspective. The UMS has always been viewed as a purely personnel system, losing sight of the meaning of the COHORT acronym. The "G-3 network", at all echelons, has largely been uninvolved while personnel policy has been pursued aggressively. Only in the light infantry where an O&O concept led to a fully implemented Traditional COHORT Model has there been a

proper balance of staff involvement. COHORT cannot be evaluated comparatively until readiness, leadership, and training programs are in place. The operations and training communities are primed to get involved and take the lead if your decision is to continue the program.

(7) Transition Versus Steady-State. An early misperception developed which negated much of the evaluation effort - the failure to differentiate between transition and steady-state. Many leaders and skeptics have developed negative attitudes and views towards COHORT because they took a near-sighted view of the one-time process of "kickstarting" COHORT units or problems of poor staff work, and concluded that "COHORT equals turbulence", as one battalion commander has reported. Our follow-on evaluation must clearly distinguish between the transition state and the steady-state and not attempt to compare COHORT units until they are out of their transition or startup phase.

(8) Fix-As-You-Go Focus. The FAYG, by design, surfaced only systemic problems that needed fixing. Some observers perceived that COHORT must be bad since the field evaluation feedback was mostly problem-oriented. This misperception can be corrected with proper marketing and feedback mechanisms.

f. Summary of Transition Management. The bottom line here is that transition is still a long term process and it is premature to "institutionalize" the system by disassembling the mechanisms of transition management now.

14. THE ARMY ENVIRONMENT OF THE FUTURE. An assessment of the worth of the COHORT and the Regimental Systems must be based on the lessons learned from the past and a projected view of the Army's future operational environment. To be viable, we should have a reasonable expectation that the UMS will impact positively on the readiness of the tactical and strategic units of the Army regardless of the operational environment. The following are postulated as having an impact on the Army of the future:

a. Continued, but Less Traumatic Force Modernization Activity. Now that force modernization has become a routine process and we have learned our lessons about COHORT startups and deployment models, unit commanders should be more receptive to UMS initiatives. Evaluation should be cleaner without the complication of new equipment fielding.

b. Continued Force Structure Turbulence. The reduced pace of force structure turbulence in the future will make UMS initiatives easier to implement and evaluate than during the past 6 years and should improve their field acceptability. Our experience has taught us how COHORT can be used to facilitate MTOE reorganization, unit activations, new equipment fielding, and unit restationing.

c. Uncertainty in Overall Force Levels. With force reductions more likely than not, this concern will be high in the minds of senior commanders. We have maintained COHORT units at higher average strength levels than non-COHORT units, especially the light infantry. Conceptually, the COHORT process should work regardless of the actual strength levels of units (a stable, cohesive unit should be better than a non-stable unit of equal strength regardless of that level).

d. Increased Difficulty in Meeting Accession Goals. Demographic projections portend a decline in the size and quality of available youth pools. There was also a corresponding increase in the complexity of warfighting technology. The struggle to maintain quality levels will cause us to relook COHORT and Regimental enlistment options. The impacts of reduced quality levels may be offset by the more highly structured COHORT unit environment which should facilitate personnel and training management.

e. More Years of Personnel Husbanding. This will place greater emphasis on retention and put a premium on family support programs and other quality of life programs. Homebasing, Regimental affiliation, and COHORT may prove to be attractive incentives to retention if developed properly.

f. Continued Budget Reductions. The recent presidential election was replete with pressures to increase funding of non-DOD programs at the expense of the Defense budget. This will place a continual squeeze on personnel, operations and support cost, and will further curtail training budgets. The reductions in operating tempo (OPTEMPO) for tactical units could be offset by the unit stability and enhanced readiness inherent in the COHORT System.

g. Probability of More Forward Deployed Forces Without Dependents. The prospects of burden-sharing and dependent capping, driven by the balance of payments problem in Europe may result in significant dependent withdrawals. The stationing of unaccompanied units in Europe or Panama could be sustained by an expansion of Sinai-type TDY unit rotations or establishment of Korea-type short tours. Both of these approaches can be supported effectively by the COHORT system. Our success in supporting families during the Sinai rotations should mitigate the effects of increased family separations.

h. No Diminution of Force Readiness Requirements. This certainly makes the evaluation of the readiness aspects of COHORT all the more imperative. If the UMS proves to be a true readiness detractor, as some commanders argue, then it should be terminated. If, on the other hand, the UMS can enhance combat readiness, then we need to continue expanding and evaluating the program.

i. Congressional Oversight of DOD. The recent trend of defense contract irregularities and the increasing cost of weapons systems will probably strengthen Congressional resolve to increase oversight of the uniformed services, in search of management inefficiencies. Congress has, in the past, been favorably disposed towards the Army's UMS initiative. Continuation and refinement of the program should send a positive signal to Congress that the Army is seeking to improve combat readiness through innovative management rather than new high dollar procurements.

j. All things considered, projections of the Army's operational environment over the next two decades suggest that the UMS is compatible with and supportive of that environment. In some areas, the UMS will benefit from the trends. In other areas, the

UMS could compensate for negative trends. There are no projected environmental conditions which are in major conflict with the UMS concept. Given the greater potential for benefit, continuation of the UMS appears prudent.

15. CONCLUSIONS. This assessment was undertaken with three options in mind: abandon the program, continue the program unchanged, and continue the program with changes. Having assessed the UMS in the context of the past, the present, and the future, the following conclusions are drawn with regard to the options cited:

a. Option 1 - Abandon the Program. Our projection of the future operational environment suggests that the need for the UMS will become even greater than it is now or was in 1981. The goals of the UMS have not changed and still appear attainable (figure 23). We have made significant progress towards these goals in some areas (such as developing cohesion) but have had less success in others (such as measuring readiness). Given the need for the UMS and the consistency of the program's goals, the only justifiable reason for abandoning the program would be unequivocal evidence that the program will not work. To date, such is not the case. As this assessment has shown, most of the empirical data collected has been inconclusive and many of the problems cited have been due to matters of implementation rather than concept. While the temptation may exist to kill the program based on the negative aspects identified to date, we must resist that temptation in light of the strong and compelling body of subjective professional judgement that says the concept works. Feedback across the board reinforces the notion, that when implemented correctly, COHORT pays off. We have done enough testing to know which models have redeeming value and which should be abandoned. We have also learned a great deal about the implementation and evaluation processes themselves to make the program more viable, if continued. Given the absence of negative empirical data, the strength of positive subjective feedback, the wealth of constructive lessons learned, and the high potential for payoff, we cannot afford to abandon the program at this point. Too much is at stake.

UNIT MANNING SYSTEM GOALS

ENHANCED COMBAT READINESS

IMPROVED COHESION

MORE EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE UNIT TRAINING

INCREASED UNIT PROFICIENCY

LONGER RETENTION OF UNIT PROFICIENCY

Figure 23

**"THOSE WHO CANNOT
REMEMBER THE PAST ARE
CONDEMNED TO REPEAT IT."**

GEORGE SANTAYANA

b. Option 2 - Continue the Program Unchanged. This assessment of the UMS today suggests that the program, as presently defined and implemented, will not succeed. We are in danger of losing the gains we have made to date because the program is drifting off course. We are fielding unproven models towards an undefined steady-state without a long range plan, with no evaluation or analysis, and without transition mechanisms to guide the process. We are not fixing some of the more serious problems of past efforts, and some important initiatives lie dormant. On its present course, it is a matter of time before the program regresses to the IRS. We should not continue the program unchanged.

c. Option 3 - Continue the Program with Changes. This option appears to offer the greater potential for ultimate success. Our assessment offers good news and bad news. The bad news is that the UMS is presently on a no-win course if nothing is changed. The good news is that we know how to change that course, and the fixes are not hard. Simply put, expand that which works and kill off that which doesn't. There is a confluence of things which work to make this review timely: the management of force modernization is now a routine process; feasible COHORT models have evolved; FM 25-100 ties leadership responsibilities to the concept; and where COHORT works, field commanders are asking to continue it. The timing is right for you to make decisions which clearly mark the way-ahead for opportunities to enhance force readiness.

16. RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. With regard to the three options cited, the recommendation of this report is to continue implementation of the UMS, consistent with the original purpose of the program (enhanced combat readiness through increased cohesion and more effective unit proficiency), and implement the program changes cited in this report (Option 3). By way of review, the recommended changes to the UMS program are summarized below:

b. UMS Concept. Publish a CSA White Paper which articulates an updated statement of the UMS concept, its goals and objectives, reinforces Army support for the program, and announces any major changes in the overall program based on decisions arising from this assessment. This paper would set the philosophical course and pace of transition for the road ahead as we continue the UMS.

c. Regimental System. Initiate a comprehensive review of the Regimental System, to include soldier affiliation, individual homebasing, and the recoupling of the COHORT and Regimental Systems. Omitted is the notion of another round of unit reflagging. The review should address the current program effectiveness, potential soldier acceptability, and recommended actions.

d. COHORT Stabilization Rules. Redefine the minimum external stabilization rules for Sustained COHORT models as follows: first term soldiers (of the high density CMF in the unit) stabilized in the COHORT battalion for 3 years (or 32 months for non-VEL soldiers in the PRS-4 model); officers and NCOs stabilized in the battalion for 2 years. These rules will provide enough external stability to allow cohesion to develop and meaningful training programs to work, yet give the battalion commander the responsibility to control internal turbulence with enough latitude to make those personnel shifts necessary for professional development and other leadership needs.

e. COHORT Unit Strength Profiles. Review current policies on COHORT unit strength profiles with a view towards eliminating any actual inequities which may exist due to COHORT and clarify the rules to eliminate misperceptions of inequity.

f. COHORT Training Strategies. Develop and field COHORT-specific training strategies and initiatives to include an O&O plan addressing COHORT training strategies, a division-level COHORT leader training program applicable to all COHORT models, and unit training management programs and guidelines tailored to specific COHORT unit life cycles. The Light Division White Paper and training strategy are a model for the utility of the COHORT training strategy.

g. COHORT Unit Readiness Model. Develop and validate a Unit Readiness Model incorporating a modified Unit Status Report, tailored to COHORT unit life cycles a la the C5 rating process for modernizing units (the Navy thinks nothing of "de-readiness" when a carrier returns from extended deployments). This model should be based on measuring readiness as a function of stability, cohesion, and collective proficiency.

h. COHORT Models. Focus on the winning models by continuing them for comparative evaluation, and kill the losers based on what we have learned.

(1) The most promising models are all non-deploying models (the division trains and retains the COHORT unit). The following models should be continued:

(a) The Traditional Non-Deploying COHORT Battalion. This model, with a fixed 3-year life cycle, was the key to the successful conversion of Infantry Forces to the ID(L) design. All combat arms battalions were activated or converted as COHORT units. Commanders who have experienced this model speak highly of it. While it is more difficult to manage than sustained models, according to WRAIR, it offers the highest potential payoff to readiness of any model yet tried. This model has the potential to facilitate the conduct of routine TDY battalion deployments to the Sinai, as we do now, or to USAREUR should the need arise to reduce dependent presence in Europe. A COHORT division could support 6 month unit rotations efficiently by synchronizing the deployments with the COHORT unit life cycle. This would provide the OCONUS theater with a steady flow of stable, cohesive units trained to the OCONUS mission through a tailored pre-deployment unit training program. The WRAIR research into the family impacts of Sinai rotations is teaching us how to mitigate the hardships of separation under such structured rotations.

(b) The Sustained COHORT Battalion (PRS-12). This model has high potential as a steady-state model. While not offering as much stability as the Traditional Model above, the 12-month interval between assignment windows offers sufficient stability to support annual progressive training programs and development of meaningful cohesion (according to WRAIR). This model can and should be improved by applying the stabilization rules recommended in paragraph 16d, above. It is easier to transition units into and out of this model than the Traditional Model. This model is applicable to both CONUS and OCONUS locations. It can also support European or Sinai deployment rotations as described above.

(c) The Sustained COHORT Battalion (PRS-4). This non-deploying model provides the least stability and training potential of any model considered because the stabilization interval between assignment windows is only 4 months. Meaningful cohesion cannot develop, according to WRAIR, and progressive training programs do not appear possible with programmed turbulence every 4 months. This model, however, is the only one under consideration that does not require VEL enlistees. Accordingly, it may be a necessity in the steady-state if the entire force cannot be sustained by other more promising models requiring VEL enlistees. Without more effective stabilization rules, however, this model is not far removed from the IRS. The potential of this model should be improved with application of the stabilization rules recommended in paragraph 16d, above. Because of the frequent reassignment windows (every 4 months), this model is not suited to support Sinai-type unit deployments.

(2) The two models which have proven to be infeasible were deploying models to USAREUR. They were terminated for USAREUR and should be dropped from consideration for any long tour areas. They are:

(a) The Company Replacement Model (18/18). This model was determined to be unsustainable by modeling analysis and unsupported by USAREUR because the COHORT soldier's OCONUS accompanied tour length (36 months) did not match the unit tour length (18 months). This left a "residual" of accompanied soldiers and families to PCS intra-theater each time a unit disestablished in USAREUR.

(b) The Battalion Rotation Model (36/36). This model was found to be unacceptable to USAREUR because the local communities and installations in Europe could not absorb the impacts of rotating battalions.

(3) The Traditional Company Replacement Model (24/12). This model to Korea should be continued because it proved sustainable and was effective in the field (1982-1986) until turned off because of the ID(L) conversion program. It has been resumed and will facilitate the 2d ID conversion to the AOE design. While the model is sound, the unit replacement scheme should be reviewed in light of MACOM concerns: EUSA has expressed concern over a

perceived "lame duck" syndrome as units near the end of the life cycle; FORSCOM believes the scheme distracts from its NATO mission; and WESTCOM believes that Hawaii should not be a sustaining base for Korea since Hawaii itself is a hardship on soldiers and families, due to island fever and isolation from the mainland. This COHORT scheme should be reviewed in light of the quasi-COHORT battalion problem (figure 16 on page 23). The CONUS base for Korea-bound replacement companies should not include quasi-COHORT battalions because quasi-COHORT is bad.

(4) New Models. The ARSTAF should look at new models to address some of the problems identified in this assessment and to prepare for future contingencies. For example, to address EUSA's concerns, the Korea replacement model could be on a 12/12/12 cycle. In this model, the unit would be established in CONUS, train for 12 months, deploy to Korea for 12 months, return to CONUS for 12 months, then disestablish. This model would avoid the "lame duck" problem for the OCONUS commander and would facilitate care of families by stabilizing them at a CONUS homebase where they have chain of command support during the spouse's absence. Such a model would also facilitate battalion command and other key leader tour lengths.

i. Evaluation. Resume formal evaluation of the UMS, to include both Regimental and COHORT issues. Employ the dual filter process (modeling analysis for sustainability and field evaluation) and the fix-as-you-go methodology.

(1) Conduct a field evaluation which compares COHORT models with each other and with IRS units. Include heavy and light forces (IN, AR, and FA) in both CONUS and OCONUS. Evaluate COHORT units only after they have fully transitioned from the IRS mode to COHORT status, and only look at units operating within the context of a COHORT division/separate brigade.

(2) Constraints. The major constraint to the expansion of the COHORT system is the limited capacity of the personnel system to access, train, and deliver first term packages, and to get the leaders to the right unit at the right time and in the right numbers (by grade and MOS). The UMS Phase I expansion plan which you approved in February 1988 was based on 364 COHORT company-size packages, which was the PERSCOM limit of supportability at that

time because of management constraints. Based on subsequent DA approved changes to the COHORT schedule, the Phase I plan has been reduced to 343 COHORT units. (Incidentally, this limitation in management capability is a potential hindrance to wartime sustainment operations.) If PERSCOM is not able to increase its capacity in the near term, then the COHORT units required to support the proposed field evaluation scope will have to come from cancellations of currently scheduled units. If the current COHORT schedule were revised, as recommended herein to support the field evaluation plan, the total requirement would be 359 COHORT companies, which is supportable by PERSCOM (the breakout of COHORT units by CMF has been considered). The packages needed to support the COHORT field evaluation would come from the 21 packages already saved by approved schedule changes and the elimination of COHORT units in quasi-COHORT battalions. The shifts in schedule proposed herein will not be traumatic, as were the kickstarts in 1985-86 for earlier COHORT models. In any event, the EDAS model needs to be fixed soon to support wartime squad and package replacement needs for casualty replenishment and unit retrofits.

(3) Evaluate the following divisions operating with the COHORT models specified:

(a) 10th ID(L) - Traditional COHORT Battalion Model. The division was activated using this model for all battalions with apparent success. Presently, PERSCOM is converting all units to the PRS-12 model but the division wants to retain the Traditional Model. The battalions can be placed back on the Traditional Model with relatively little disruption to soldiers, the units, or the personnel system. Properly scheduled across the division, this model will not exacerbate the overseas levy process. This approach will provide a readily available test bed in the immediate future for this model and enable us to refine and evaluate wartime unit reconstitution procedures as described in paragraph 7g on page 18. The division commander concurs.

(b) 7th ID(L) - Sustained COHORT Battalion (PRS-12) Model. Since the division is already on this model, it provides a logical and immediate test environment for this model with no startup, lead-time, or turbulence. The only action required is to apply the stabilization rules recommended in paragraph 16d, above. The division commander concurs.

(c) 25th ID(L) - Sustained COHORT Battalion (PRS-4) Model. The division is already on this model, providing a readily available test bed for this model with no startup, lead-time, or turbulence. The stabilization rules recommended in paragraph 16d, above, should be applied prior to evaluation. The division commander concurs.

(d) 1st ID(F) and 2d AD(F) - Sustained COHORT Battalion (PRS-4) Model. The use of these two units to test COHORT in USAREUR appear logical for the following reasons: both units are geographically and organizationally autonomous, thereby facilitating evaluation; both units are approximately 50 percent COHORT already (on the PRS-4 model), which reduces startup lead-time and disruption compared to other forces in Europe; the PRS-4 model is the least disruptive model to transition to; and the CINCUSAREUR supports the PRS-4 model.

(e) 1st ID - Sustained COHORT Battalion (PRS-12) Model. A full evaluation of the PRS-12 model requires that it be tested in a heavy force environment. Since there are no heavy units in the Army currently on (or scheduled to be on) the PRS-12 model, such an evaluation will require a change to the UMS plan. The 1st ID is a logical choice because it is a small division on a one-division post (which facilitates test control) and four of its eight battalions are already COHORT (they are on the PRS-4 model and would require transition to PRS-12, which is easier than starting up a division with no COHORT battalions at all). Evaluation of this division would not start until all units transition to COHORT.

(4) The above recommendations lay out a first cut at the scope of an evaluation necessary to address all models currently considered feasible. This process will be refined as the field evaluation plan is developed and staffed with the MACOMs and ARSTAF.

j. Implementation Strategy. Develop and implement a long-range UMS implementation strategy and plan based on back planning from a projected steady-state. Revise the existing Phase I COHORT unit schedule to support the implementation strategy, to include as a minimum, the following:

(1) Revise the COHORT schedule so as to establish the number of COHORT battalions (by model, type unit, and location) to support the evaluation strategy outlined in paragraph 16i, above. This can be accomplished by eliminating quasi-COHORT battalions (those with a mix of COHORT and non-COHORT companies) as soon as possible. The COHORT companies deleted from these battalions should be used to form the COHORT units in the divisions cited for field evaluation.

(2) After meeting test requirements, continue to expand the PRS-4 model in USAREUR, consistent with PERSCOM's capabilities and the progress of the EDAS in support of the COHORT system expansion. Any further expansion of COHORT, regardless of the model, should be based on

forming one full battalion, one brigade, one division at a time. Our assessment shows that this strategy will provide COHORT commanders with a supportive operational and training environment, and avoid the pitfalls experienced by commanders of "isolated" COHORT units in the past.

k. Roles and Responsibilities. Assign proponentcy of the UMS to the DCSOPS, reestablish a UMS policy cell on the ARSTAF (reporting directly to the DCSOPS), and concur in the roles and responsibilities shown below:

(1) DCSOPS (policy and procedure) with DCSPER in support.

(2) PERSCOM (UMS management).

(3) TRADOC (concept definition, field evaluation, and analysis) with WRAIR and ARI support.

l. Stability Correlation Test. Design and conduct a separate field test to determine empirical correlations between small unit/crew stability, cohesion, and proficiency to support fielding of a stability-based unit readiness model.

17. TRADOC's ROLE. If your decision is to proceed, and proceed we must if we believe in unit stability in combat, some immediate actions are needed to maintain continuity of effort and regain momentum in some aspects of the program. TRADOC has initiated planning to undertake those initiatives considered timely and of high priority. Each will be staffed and presented to the ARSTAF for approval prior to execution. Subject to your concurrence and/or guidance, TRADOC will continue to plan the following actions:

a. UMS Concept Definition. Prepare a CSA UMS White Paper for approval and publication as described in paragraph 16b.

b. Evaluation Plan. Develop and conduct a UMS evaluation which includes sustainability analysis and field evaluation.

c. Regimental Study. Conduct a Regimental System Study.

d. Training Strategies. Develop, submit for approval, and field COHORT unit training strategies.

e. Readiness Model. Develop, submit for approval, and validate a COHORT-specific unit readiness model based on stability parameters and COHORT life cycles.

UNIT MANNING SYSTEM

Glossary (terms are defined in the context of UMS)

Acceptability - The receptivity of the Army towards the UMS concept, policies, and COHORT models.

Affordability - The Army's ability to support a COHORT system within the constraints of available manpower, money, and facilities.

Assignment Eligibility and Availability - AEA Code R - A personnel assignment code applied to soldiers assigned to a Traditional COHORT unit which precludes a PERSCOM automatic computer selection of that soldier for reassignment. The code is intended to preclude personnelists throughout the chain of command from moving the soldier from his COHORT unit during his tenure in the COHORT unit. AEA Code R is currently applied only to Traditional 24/12 COHORT companies during the first 2 year leg of their life cycle. AEA Code R is not currently in use in Sustained COHORT units.

Assignment Window - Fixed periods (approximately 1 week) in the unit life cycle when personnel may be assigned into or out of a COHORT unit.

Attrition - Unprogrammed losses to the Army (medical, indiscipline, etc).

Bonding - The process of molding a group of soldiers and their leaders into a cohesive, synergistic combat force. Bonding is a function of stability, shared experience, and common values.

Bonding (Horizontal) - The bonding of a group of peers into a cohesive, synergistic body who share common values, goals, and attitudes.

Bonding (Organizational) - The synergistic outcome of overall unit cohesion, concerned leadership, and meaningful training activities. It is the focus of soldier identification with the values of his unit and the Army.

Bonding (Vertical) - The bonding of first term soldiers and their leaders through successive levels of the chain of command.

Cadre - All personnel in a COHORT unit other than the high density CMF first termers. Includes all NCOs and commissioned officers of a unit and the low density CMF personnel of all grades.

Deployer - A COHORT unit whose personnel, upon completing a specified period of time in a CONUS or OCONUS installation, will deploy OCONUS or CONUS to continue and complete the COHORT unit life cycle.

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Disestablish - The process of reassigning or separating all the soldiers assigned to a Traditional COHORT unit at the end of its prescribed 3-year life cycle.

Dual Filter - The UMS evaluation methodology designed to subject all candidate COHORT models to modeling analysis in a projected steady-state to determine sustainability, affordability, and to field evaluation to determine manageability, and acceptability.

Establish - The process of forming a COHORT unit by aligning the ETS, DEROS, and availability dates of all the soldiers so as to meet prescribed COHORT unit stabilization requirements. These actions involve reassignments, extensions, and curtailments.

First Termers - A soldier serving his initial enlistment in the Army. In this report, the term refers to initial term soldiers in the high density CMF of the COHORT unit (CMF 11 - IN, CMF 13 - FA, CMF 19 - AR).

Fix-As-You-Go - The UMS evaluation methodology designed to identify systemic problems through on-site data collection and provide feedback to the Army staff in order to implement policy and regulation changes necessary to institutionalize the UMS.

Group Movement - The movement of COHORT soldiers as a group between CONUS and OCONUS through the transportation system moving under a DA (PERSCOM) movement directive. COHORT unit deployments are technically group movements, since UICs and unit colors do not displace.

Homebasing - This term conveys three connotations: Each Regiment has a CONUS installation homebase for its Regimental colors; each battalion in the Regiment has an installation homebase; career soldiers have a CONUS installation homebase to which they will be assigned on a recurring basis whenever possible.

Interval - The period of time between prescribed assignment windows during which soldiers and leaders are stabilized in a COHORT unit. No personnel are assigned into or out of the unit during the stabilization interval. The interval varies with different COHORT models.

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Kickstart - The process of initially establishing a COHORT unit by reassigning most of the soldiers out of a non-COHORT unit and refilling it at one time with soldiers who can be stabilized in the unit together for a prescribed period.

Leader Training, COHORT - As applied to the UMS, a unit program of instruction to train leaders assigned to a COHORT unit in the dynamics of cohesion and the value of, and techniques for, developing stability, bonding, and progressive training programs tailored to the COHORT unit life cycle. As originally defined, this program was applicable only to Traditional models, and was accomplished prior to the arrival of first term soldiers from OSUT. It can be applied at division/installation level for any COHORT model.

Life Cycle - As applied to UMS, a description of events which define a particular COHORT model in terms of major nodes of its existence (i.e., establishment, disestablishment, rotation, replacement, assignment windows, stabilization interval). For Traditional COHORT models, these events describe a fixed 3-year unit life cycle. For Sustained COHORT models they describe a continuous unit life cycle.

Manageability - The ability of the Army's existing management systems to support the UMS on a given set of COHORT models and other parameters. At the macro level, accession, training, and personnel systems are relevant. At the local level, installation, training, personnel, and community/family support systems are pertinent.

Non-Deployer - A COHORT unit that remains at the same location where it was formed (CONUS or OCONUS). Commander trains and retains unit.

Operating Tempo (OPTEMPO) - The annual operating miles or hours for the major equipment system in a battalion-level or equivalent organization. OPTEMPO is used by commanders to forecast and allocate funds for fuel and repair parts for training events and programs.

Package Replacement System - A replacement system which moves groups of personnel (including first term soldiers that trained together in IET, and career soldiers from the total Army) that are assigned to a Sustained COHORT unit at 4- or 12-month intervals, depending on the COHORT model.

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Pre-Deployment Training - A formal training phase in the life cycle of deploying COHORT models (6 months prior to deployment of the COHORT unit) during which time the COHORT unit trains specifically to the mission, climate, and terrain of its OCONUS destination. This training is operational (i.e., contingency plans, unit SOPs, METL) as well as administrative (i.e., drivers' licenses, cultural orientation). The PDT program is developed jointly by the OCONUS and CONUS MACOMs to minimize the assimilation burden upon arrival of the unit OCONUS.

Quasi-COHORT Battalion - A battalion with a mix of COHORT and non-COHORT companies (usually one to two COHORT line companies). In practice, commanders of quasi-COHORT battalions operate in the Individual Replacement System modality and the COHORT companies are unable to exploit their stable unit environment.

Regiment - For combat arms, an informal grouping of battalions with the same regimental designation, which provides a framework for the recurring assignment of soldiers to elements of their regiment throughout their career.

Regimental Affiliation - The close and continuous association or identification of a soldier with a single Regiment or institution throughout his career. When a combat arms soldier is assigned at battalion level he should serve with one of the battalions within his Regiment. The intent is to foster a strong sense of belonging, esprit, identification, and loyalty among soldiers through long term continuous affiliation with their regiments. For CS/CSS forces this association is with their technical branch.

Sawtooth - A graphic description of the strength profile of a COHORT unit over time in terms of its strength ceiling, strength floor, attrition rate, and the interval between assignment windows. The shape of the sawtooth will vary among COHORT models based on the characteristics of the models.

Stabilization - As applied to the UMS, the process of assigning soldiers and leaders to a unit at the same time and keeping them together as long as possible. It is the common alignment and stabilization of soldiers' tours of duty in the unit that makes the unit COHORT.

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Steady-State - A term used to describe a point in time when the Army has completed the transition to the fully implemented UMS and all possible battalions are on a COHORT schedule. As applied to a specific COHORT unit, it is the point in time when a unit has completed its transition to a particular COHORT model.

Sustainability - The ability of the Army's personnel system to support the flow of personnel through COHORT models in such a way as to maintain the UMS in the steady-state and still support other total Army requirements.

Sustained COHORT - A COHORT model without a fixed life cycle. Soldiers and leaders are assigned into and out of the unit via the Package Replacement System only at prescribed assignment windows. Soldiers are stabilized in the unit during the interval between assignment windows (may be 4 or 12 months, depending upon the COHORT model).

Top-Off Package - A package of replacements designed to offset unprogrammed losses to a Traditional COHORT unit. Traditional COHORT units are "topped off" annually. (By contrast, packages assigned to Sustained COHORT units are designed to replace both programmed and unprogrammed losses.)

Traditional COHORT - A COHORT model with a fixed 3-year life cycle in which all soldiers and leaders are stabilized for the entire life cycle. It may be a deploying or non-deploying model.

Turbulence (External) - As applied to the UMS, the movement of personnel into or out of a COHORT unit as directed by PERSCOM or the chain of command above the COHORT unit.

Turbulence (Internal) - As applied to the UMS, the intra-unit movement of personnel by COHORT unit leaders.

Unit Movement - As applied to the UMS, the periodic movement of COHORT units between CONUS and OCONUS, on either a one-way unit replacement or a two-way unit rotation scheme.

Unit Replacement - A unit movement system characterized by a one-way flow of COHORT units from CONUS to replace disestablishing units OCONUS.

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Unit Rotation - As applied to the UMS, a COHORT unit movement system where one CONUS unit and a like-type OCONUS unit exchange locations periodically.

UNIT MANNING SYSTEM

Acronyms

AEA	Assignment Eligibility and Availability
ARI	Army Research Institute
ATRRS	Army Training Resources and Requirements System
CAA	Concepts Analysis Agency
CARS	Combat Arms Regimental System
CIM	COHORT Integration Model
COHORT	Cohesion, Operational Readiness and Training
EDAS	Enlisted Distribution Assignment System
EDRE	Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise
FAYG	Fix-As-You-Go
HAAP	Homebasing and Advanced Assignment Program
IRS	Individual Replacement System
IWQ	Individual Weapons Qualification
MSR	Manning System Requirement
MTF	Manning Task Force
NMS	New Manning System
NWTI	Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection
O&O	Organizational and Operational
ORT	Operational Readiness Test

UNIT MANNING SYSTEM

Acronyms

PERSCOM	U.S. Total Army Personnel Command
PRS	Package Replacement System
UIC	Unit Identification Code
UMS	Unit Manning System
VEL	Variable Enlistment Legislation
WRAIR	Walter Reed Army Institute of Research

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